Center for Community Law

President Boakai Reinstates Liberia’s Electoral Chief

Guest — Fri, 21 Feb 2025 18:24:50 +0000

President Boakai Reinstates Liberia’s Electoral Chief
Center for Community Law

By Paul Ejime*
President Joseph Boakai has reinstated Madam Davidetta Browne-Lansanah as Chairperson of Liberia’s National Elections Commission (NEC) one month after her “indefinite” suspension from the post.
According to an Executive Mansion statement on 15 January 2025, her suspension had followed an investigation into recent protests by aggrieved NEC workers regarding “administrative decisions taken by the NEC Chairperson without proper consultation.”
Madam Browne-Lansanah was accused of “unilaterally announcing the closure of the NEC office for one month and dismissing 25 employees without the knowledge or approval of the NEC Board of Commissioners, as required by law.”
However, in a vindication of Madam Browne-Lansanah, a new government statement on 20th February said the lifting of the suspension was “with immediate effect,” following a high-level meeting on 18th February “attended by the NEC Board of Commissioners, the ECOWAS Ambassador to Liberia, and senior officials of the Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs.”
In administrative language, an indefinite suspension of a public servant is usually followed by dismissal, but informed sources said, “nothing untoward or unprofessional” was found against Madam Madam Browne-Lansanah.
According to the sources, “some politicians within the corridors of power might have tried to use NEC insiders to undermine the authority of a woman described as “rugged, strong-willed and independent-minded.”
Madam Browne-Lansanah received local and international praise for delivering a successful and one of Liberia’s most credible and transparent presidential and legislative elections in October 2023.
She was reported to have clashed with some commissioners last year over administrative matters resulting in the dismissal of some employees for “gross insubordination.”
This led to protests by some employees at the NEC headquarters in Monrovia.
Under the Liberian constitution, the NEC chairperson’s role is tenured, and Madam Browne-Lansanah’s term runs out in two years.
Liberia’s Rule of Law Legislative Caucus had described her suspension as “unconstitutional,” affirming that “NEC’s independence, protected under the Constitution, is vital to safeguarding democracy” in the country.
“The Supreme Court of Liberia has ruled unequivocally that the suspension of tenured officers is tantamount to their removal. Such removals are constitutionally permissible only through the impeachment process, which involves, the National Legislature,” the Caucus added.
It urged the “President to rescind (his) decision and allow constitutional processes to prevail,” adding: “The erosion of institutional independence risks plunging the country into uncharted territory and threatens the very essence of our democracy.”
To his credit, President Boakai has allowed the rule of law to prevail, with Madam Browne-Lansanah’s reputation intact.
In lifting the suspension, the president expressed the hope that the “uncertainty surrounding the NEC has been addressed, clearing the way for the smooth conduct of the upcoming Nimba County by-election to fill the vacancy left as a result of the passing of Senator Prince Yormie Johnson.”
The NEC was part of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended Liberia’s14-year civil war. It replaced the 1986 Elections Commission as “an autonomous government institution, independent of any branch of government with powers to run elections in Liberia.”
According to Chapter 2, Section 2.1 of the New Elections Law of 2014, the NEC “shall be under the direction and management of seven (7) Commissioners appointed by the President of Liberia, who shall appoint one of them as Chairman and another as Co-Chairman. All of the appointments shall be subject to the consent of the Senate.”
Madam Browne-Lansanah is the fifth NEC Chairperson. In 2011, one of her predecessors, James Fromayan was forced to step down after being accused of bias by then-opposition leader George Weah.
The same George Weah, as President, appointed Madam Browne-Lansanah as NEC Chair in April 2020 and lost his re-election bid in the 2023 elections conducted by her.
A veteran broadcast journalist with a master’s degree in public administration and bachelor’s degrees in political science and public administration, Madam Browne-Lansanah also boasts some career experience working in the UN system before joining NEC 10 years ago as a commissioner.
She served as Co-Chair and Acting Chairperson before assuming the substantive position of Chairperson in 2020, pledging to “strengthen NEC’s core values of independence, integrity, professionalism and consistency.”
At a time when the ECOWAS region is grappling with the resurgence of military incursions in politics, badly run elections and three member States on the verge of quitting the 15-nation organisation, Liberia, Senegal and lately Ghana, hold up hope for survival of electoral democracy
*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communication*

The post President Boakai Reinstates Liberia’s Electoral Chief appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Guest

ECOWAS, UN Joint Mission to Support Peace Efforts in Guinea Bissau

Guest — Fri, 21 Feb 2025 18:21:02 +0000

ECOWAS, UN Joint Mission to Support Peace Efforts in Guinea Bissau
Center for Community Law

A joint mission of ECOWAS and the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), has been dispatched “to support national efforts toward peace and stability” in Guinea Bissau.

“The mission is in line with the directive of the 66th Ordinary Session of the Authority of (ECOWAS) Heads of States and Government held on 15th December 2024 in Abuja, Nigeria, to ‘deploy a high-level political mission to the country to support efforts by the political actors and stakeholders toward political consensus on the electoral calendar,’” the ECOWAS Commission said in a statement on Thursday.

The objective is “to accompany Guinea Bissau with the requisite technical support toward a successful electoral cycle and the promotion of peace, security, and stability in the country,” the statement added.

The 23-28 February 2025 Mission is led by Ambassador Bagudu Hirse, Nigeria’s former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and will be joined by Ambassador Kalilou Traore, Ivorian Ambassador to Nigeria and ECOWAS, representing the ECOWAS Permanent Representatives Committee, and Ambassador Babatunde Ajisomo, ECOWAS former Representative to Liberia, as Special Adviser to the Head of Mission.

Other members of the joint delegation are Mr Cherno Mamoudu Jallow, a former Senior Political Advisor, Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the DR Congo and the UN Mission, MONUSCO, and Mr. Papa Birame Sene, from the Senegalese Electoral Commission.

A technical team, including Ambassador Ngozi Ukaeje, the ECOWAS Resident Representative in Guinea Bissau, and staff of the Directorate of Political Affairs of the ECOWAS Commission will support the Mission.

The delegation will hold consultations with the government and other critical stakeholders on the political and security developments in the country.

President Embalo assumed office in February 2020 following a disputed December 2019 presidential poll, whose outcome was finally decided by the Supreme Court in September 2020.

His tenure has been characterised by instability and political tensions including two alleged military coups and the government’s dissolution of the national parliament, with the national electoral commission and the Supreme Court in a dysfunctional state.

ECOWAS has a military mission providing a level of stabilisation in the country.

Early this month, a controversially constituted Supreme Court fixed the presidential election in Guinea Bissau for September 2025, explaining that the president’s tenure began after the apex Court ruled in his favour in September 2020, and not February when he took the oath of office.

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In Defence of Judicial Authority in Nigeria

Guest — Sun, 16 Feb 2025 22:08:58 +0000

In Defence of Judicial Authority in Nigeria
Center for Community Law

By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu*

“The judiciary… has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment.” – Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 78.
In January 1983, a suspicious fire incident did considerable damage to NECOM House, the high-rise building in Lagos that housed the headquarters of the country’s telecommunications monopoly, then known as the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited, NITEL. Alhaji Shehu Shagari was in power as elected civilian president.
The belief was widespread that the fire was the handiwork of “senior officials in the building (who) had been under investigation for fraud and embezzlement that police estimated at more than US$100 million.”
The NECOM House fire was another in a succession of high-profile incidents with a whiff of arson affecting public infrastructure in the country. The previous month, another fire had consumed the Ministry of External Affairs, reportedly “set by accountants who were under investigation.”
Casualty count from the fire incident was substantial but uncertain.
By some coincidence, the fire occurred the week after the fire-fighting team at the facility had been inexplicably withdrawn. The response of the federal authorities was even more inexplicable.
The 21 persons whom they chose to prosecute in connection with the incident included Ray Ekpu, at the time a senior journalist and columnist, whose crime appeared to be that he published an article after the incident suggesting that it was arson.
Also charged were Adamu Akokhia, then-Chief Fire Officer of the Federation; and Saidu Garba, the Divisional Fire Officer responsible for the building. While they were suspects in pending criminal proceedings, the federal authorities also suspended Adamu Akokhia and Saidu Garba from work.
Saidu Garba sued at the High Court of Lagos State challenging his suspension. While his case was still pending, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, John Oyegun, issued a letter sacking him from the public service.
Informed of this development, the presiding judge, Yahaya Jinadu, summoned John Oyegun to appear before him and explain why he should not be held in contempt of court. The judge subsequently found Mr. Oyegun guilty of contempt, cautioned him and ordered him to withdraw the letter of termination issued to Saidu Garba while his case was pending.
Despite the forbearance of the court, Mr. Oyegun failed to comply. On 3 August 1984, the court ordered his lawyer to secure compliance by his client with the order or cease participation in the proceedings until he complied.
By this time, Major-General Muhammadu Buhari was in his eighth month in power as military ruler, having overthrown Shagari.
Five days later, on 8 August, then Chief Judge of Lagos State, Adetunji Adefarasin, summarily withdrew the case file from Yahaya Jinadu and reassigned it to himself, claiming that he did so at the request of the trial judge. Yahaya Jinadu denied ever having made such a request to the Chief Judge.
While Yahaya Jinadu was on pilgrimage to Mecca shortly thereafter, the Advisory Judicial Committee (AJC), then chaired by Chief Justice Sodeinde Sowemimo (the same one who infamously convicted Obafemi Awolowo two decades earlier), constituted a committee “that curiously condemned his actions and asked him to make written and verbal apologies” to, among others, the federal attorney-general, the President of the Court of Appeal, and the Chief Judge of Lagos State. Unwilling to abide an order which he characterised as “humiliation and disgrace of the judiciary”, Yahaya Jinadu served the statutory sixty-day notice of his intention to resign as a judge. In response, the military regime terminated his judicial career summarily.
For being acutely aware of the duty to conserve the currency of judicial authority and being prepared to defend that, Yahaya Jinadu paid a heavy price with his career. Those who traduced him set in motion a deadly corrosion of judicial authority whose inter-generational consequences today endanger the very foundations of both the institution and the country.
Two contemporaneous events this past week dramatized how badly so.
Addressing judges at the beginning of the week at a continuing judicial education event in Abuja, the Federal Capital, Chief Justice of the Federation, Kudirat Kekere-Ekun, complained about deepening public distrust of the judiciary, reminding her colleagues that “it is not enough to be impartial; we must also be seen to be impartial. The perception of bias or impropriety can be as damaging as the reality itself.”
At about the same time as the Chief Justice uttered them, these sentiments were on trial at another end of town. The Federal High Court in Abuja was the venue of the now viral contretemps between Nnamdi Kanu, self-proclaimed leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPoB), on the one hand; and the presiding judge, the lead prosecutor, and even his own team of lawyers, on the other. If anything was more troubling than the conduct of Mr. Kanu in that outing, it was the self-inflicted lack of judicial authority to firmly put a stop to it.
To be sure, there are ample provisions in the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) empowering courts to preserve their authority or act against the disruption of their proceedings. A judge for a quarter of a century and a state attorney-general before that, the one charge that cannot possibly be made against the presiding judge in this case is inexperience. So, why was the court, nevertheless, so craven?
On 24 September 2024, Justice Binta Nnyako had ruled in respect of the same proceedings concerning Mr. Kanu that: “The root of adjudication is confidence. The defendant has no confidence in this court.
Consequently, I hereby recuse myself from this trial and hereby remit the case file to the Chief Judge for further necessary action.” Three weeks later, it was reported that the Chief Judge decided administratively to overrule the trial judge’s recusal and return the case file to her.
There are, however, two problems with this decision.
First, as a matter of law, the Chief Judge may be a first among his peers but he is no paramount chief at large. His powers do not extend to administratively overruling a written decision of a judge sitting as such. Second, as a practical matter, a judge who by her own hand rules to recuse herself from proceedings after affirming cratered confidence in her handling of the proceedings cannot allow herself to be bullied or inveigled into attempting to ingest her judicial vomit.
The coincidence of these two developments almost assuredly denied the court of its constitutive authority, making it a passenger in that piece of execrable judicial theatre.
The standard under the 1999 constitution is that a court shall be constituted “in such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.”
A judge cannot return to claim impartiality and independence after having gone on record to recuse herself for having lost the confidence of the defendant. A forum in that setting hardly deserves the appellation of a court.
Nigeria’s 1999 constitution speaks loosely of “judicial power”. The traditional tools of power in this sense are coercive or transactional. As a fact, the judiciary lacks both. Its currency is neither arms nor money. Rather it is reason and authority.
To the extent that it is possible to salvage anything from the wreckage of those proceedings in that Federal High Court last week, it is the importance of holding the feet of the judiciary to fire when any judge – no matter how high – acts in a manner that casually endangers that authority. The costs of not doing so are incalculable.
*A lawyer and teacher, Odinkalu can be reached at chidi.odinkalu@tufts.edu*

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Djibouti’s Foreign Minister is African Union Commission’s New Chairperson

Guest — Sat, 15 Feb 2025 22:00:27 +0000

Djibouti’s Foreign Minister is African Union Commission’s New Chairperson
Center for Community Law

*By Paul Ejime*

Continental leaders at their 38th ordinary summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on Saturday 15 February 2025 elected Djibouti’s Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf as the African Union Commission, AUC’s Chairperson for four years.
Youssouf replaces Moussa Faki of Chad, who has led the Commission since 2017.
Selma Malika Haddadi, Algeria’s Ambassador to Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the African Union was also elected Deputy Chairperson.
With the position zoned to East Africa, Youssouf waited until the seventh round of balloting to obtain the mandatory 33 votes to clinch the post at the expense of two other contestants, Madagascar’s ex-Foreign Minister Richard Randriamandrato and Kenya’s former Prime Minister and veteran opposition leader Raila Odinga.
Haddadi also won in the 7th round beating her North African rivals from Egypt and Morocco, to replace out-going Dr Monique Nsanzabaganwa of Rwanda on the deputy Chairperson’s role.
Odinga, the frontrunner for the leadership position before the summit, won the first round and Youssouf led from the second round after the Madagascan candidate dropped off the race.
Saturday’s marathon balloting was preceded by the election of AUC Commissioners including the re-election of Nigeria’s Ambassador Bankole Adeoye as Commissioner of Political Affairs, Peace and Security and Ghana’s Ambassador Amma Twum-Amoah as Commissioner of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, both from West Africa.
Youssouf, the 59-year-old Djibouti diplomat, studied foreign languages in France, with advanced training in business management in the UK and Brussels, He served as his country’s ambassador to Egypt under three previous administrations before he was appointed Foreign Minister in 2005.
“If I am elected (Chairperson) of the African Union Commission, my priority will be financial management and governance,” he said in Rabat, Morocco last December. “My goal will also be to mobilise internal funds. Djibouti has always been a source of trust and credibility, able to play a leading role in promoting stability and security…”
He will inherit a continental organisation, grappling with internal leadership challenges, compounded by daunting continental and global problems, including insecurity, political and socio-economic instability, insecurity, terrorism and violent extremism, civil and inter-state wars, general governance and climate change concerns.
With active or simmering violent conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Mozambique and part of Ethiopia, the AUC’s host country, and at least six of the 55-nation Member States – Chad, Sudan, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Niger – under military dictatorships, the new AUC leadership under Youssouf have their job cut out for them.
The AUC replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002.
*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communications*

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The Black Sheep in ECOWAS

Guest — Fri, 14 Feb 2025 23:06:39 +0000

The Black Sheep in ECOWAS
Center for Community Law

*By Paul Ejime*

ECOWAS is struggling to whip its wayward member States into line, but the list of leaders undermining the principles and objectives of the 15-nation West African regional economic bloc is growing.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which proclaimed themselves the Alliance of Sahel States, AES, are making every effort to quit, while Guinea, a fourth military-ruled Member State, is enduring a tardy transition programme.
While much attention is focused on these four countries, political tension is building up in at least four other ECOWAS Member States.
In Cote d’Ivoire, the next presidential election is scheduled for October this year but as happened in the run-up to the last election in 2020, there is so much uncertainty in the air. Sitting President Alassane Ouattara, 83, says he would like to continue serving his country as president, although his party has not yet decided its candidate.
With tenure elongation as a political tinderbox, Ouattara had previously said he would like to step down to give the young ones a chance but only if his old rivals would quit politics too.
If he runs in October, opponents and critics would consider it Ouattara’s fourth term bid in the ECOWAS region where third-term syndrome is a major source of political instability.
The Gambia is another ticking bomb, linked with the political ambition of President Adama Borrow, who appears laser-focused on the 2026 presidential election.
ECOWAS had to mobilise human and material resources including military assets to end the 22-year brutal dictatorship of Yahya Jammeh in January 2017 in the Gambia.
But instead of concentrating on governance or real change, President Barrow, who was inaugurated as Jammeh’s successor in Senegal because of instability in the Gambia, is still operating the same 1997 Jammeh era Constitution and pressuring ECOWAS to endorse his establishment of a Special Tribunal to try crimes committed under the Jammeh dictatorship after co-opting some of the old regime prominent figures to win re-election.
Barrow set up a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) in 2017, which submitted a draft Constitution to him in September 2020. His government, however, jettisoned that draft document produced at great financial cost, to concentrate on his re-election in 2021.
A 2024 draft Constitution, which his opponents call the “Barrow Draft Constitution” was only presented to the Gambian Parliament in December 2024. It is expected to pass through a national referendum before another presidential election in 2026, and Barrow has already declared he would run.
This month (February 2025) is critical in the political history of two other ECOWAS member States – Guinea Bissau and Togo.
While the world’s attention is focused elsewhere, Togo will hold a dubious Senatorial election on 15 February 2025.
The President of the Independent National Electoral Commission, CENI, had extended the date for the submission of candidates to 7 January 2025, in line with a government decree dated 26 December 2024, which set the senatorial elections for February 15, 2025.
Analysts have dubbed the vote Perpetuating Gnassingbé Dynasty 2025 Elections a reference to President Faure Gnassingbé’s succession of his father Gnassingbé Eyadema in 2005.
In March 2024, Togo’s parliament dominated by Faure’s ruling UNIR party, voted 87-0 to adopt a constitutional change decreed by the President that eliminates citizens’ right to vote directly for the country’s leader.
That change to a parliamentary system of government, in violation of ECOWAS protocols, also established a new powerful executive President of the Council of Ministers (PCM), to be elected by members of Parliament, and will function as a prime minister with sweeping powers.
Since the political party or coalition with the most seats in Parliament will produce the PCM, Faure is guaranteed that role going by the results of the sham legislative elections hurriedly held in April 2024 after the controversial constitutional review that gave the UNIR 108 of the 113 Parliamentary seats.
The February 15 Senatorial elections will create a new upper chamber of Togo’s legislature, with 75% of the seats elected by local authority representatives and the remainder appointed directly by the PCM.
In addition, the PCM will serve a six-year term, against the five years of the current presidency, and is renewable indefinitely.
These changes are against the spirit and letters of the ECOWAS protocols and instruments, but the Faure regime has gone unchallenged.
Little wonder Togo’s Foreign Minister Robert Dussey recently declared that his country could join the AES countries, even though President Gnassingbé, is one of the leaders mandated by ECOWAS to negotiate rapprochement with the alliance States. The suggestion could be a ploy to pre-empt any move by ECOWAS to chastise the Lome government.
As if these were not enough troubles, the President of Guinea Bissau Umaro Embalo has complicated matters for the regional organisation.
Embalo’s presidential mandate expires on 27 February 2025, but only a miracle can stop him from continuing in office beyond that date, since he has dissolved the country’s parliament for more than a year now, with the electoral commission and the Supreme Court also in comatose.
Like Faure, Embalo’s moves have also gone unchallenged by other ECOWAS leaders.
ECOWAS leaders, who undermine the organisation’s objectives and regional integration agenda without consequence are emboldened by their colleagues who fail to call them out.
This has been on for over a decade in the organisation which marks its 50th anniversary in May this year.
Given its achievements as a foremost Regional Economic Community in Africa, the authoritarian tendencies and disregard for rules by the ECOWAS black sheep, have caused more than enough damage to demand introspection and reflection on the consequences/implications of a West Africa without ECOWAS as a stabilising force.
How can the “ECOWAS of States” be transformed into an “ECOWAS of People”?
Ghana’s new President John Mahama has started well by naming a Special Envoy to the AES countries. His initiative should fit into an integrated ECOWAS effort to arrest the drift.
The Faure Gnassingbe-Senegalese President Diomaye Faye pair as ECOWAS mediators with the AES countries is not working and should be reviewed for effective results.
Before convening another emergency summit, the ongoing African Union Summit in Addis Ababa presents a cost-effective opportunity for ECOWAS leaders to put heads together on the sidelines of the continental gathering to discuss the region’s myriad security, economic and governance challenges.
The re-election of Nigeria’s Ambassador Bankole Adeoye as the AU Commissioner of Political Affairs, Peace and Security and the election of Ghana’s Ambassador Amma Twum-Amoah as Commissioner of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, (both from West Africa), is another good development that ECOWAS can leverage on.
Also, citizens and civil society organisations in the ECOWAS region should live up to their fundamental civic responsibilities by holding rulers/leaders to account.
The axiom that power belongs to the people is not an alien concept.
For instance, without the use of kinetics or military incursion, the people of Burkina Faso ousted President Blaise Compaoré and forced him into exile in 2014.
Recently the electorates in Liberia, Senegal and Ghana also changed the governments of their countries through the ballot box and by protecting their votes.
Voters who sell their votes, or vote along primordial ethnic, tribal or religious lines, and citizens who fail to participate in politics, expecting others to pick their chestnuts from the fire only have themselves to blame.
Every country deserves the type of government it deserves.
Citizens are indispensable repositories of power in political governance. If ECOWAS leaders want ECOWAS and their countries to work, they can do so. Every country gets the type of government or leaders it deserves.
Lastly, while ECOWAS must intentionally tackle its existential challenges, the AES junta leaders should not create the impression that ECOWAS is responsible for the leadership, security and colonial problems in their countries.

*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communications*

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African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Hear Landmark Case Between DRC and Rwanda

Centre for Community Law — Tue, 11 Feb 2025 19:01:23 +0000

African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Hear Landmark Case Between DRC and Rwanda
Center for Community Law

A historic legal battle is set to unfold as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) prepares to hear a crucial case between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Rwanda. Scheduled for February 12 and 13, 2025, at the Court’s seat in Arusha, Tanzania, this case marks a significant milestone in the pursuit of justice and accountability in Africa.
Background of the Case
On August 21, 2023, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Applicant State) filed an application against Rwanda (Respondent State), citing severe human rights violations. The claims are based on multiple legal frameworks, including:
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
The Protocol to the African Charter on Women’s Rights
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
At the core of the allegations are human rights violations linked to the ongoing armed conflict in eastern DRC since 2021. The conflict, involving the DRC’s armed forces and the M23 rebel group, has been exacerbated by alleged backing from Rwanda.
Key Allegations
The DRC contends that Rwanda’s actions have led to:
Massacres and occupation of several territories
The displacement of over 520,000 people
A cholera epidemic due to poor sanitary conditions in displaced populations
The destruction of schools, depriving 20,000 children of education
Widespread damage to infrastructure, including power facilities, homes, health centres, and agricultural land
The harbouring of individuals accused of serious crimes, despite international arrest warrants issued against them
In response, the DRC is seeking a court ruling that holds Rwanda accountable, orders the withdrawal of its alleged support for M23, and mandates reparations for victims and damages caused by the conflict.
Rwanda’s Defence and Court Proceedings
Rwanda has challenged the Court’s jurisdiction over the matter and questioned the admissibility of the case. Consequently, the upcoming public hearing will focus on determining whether the AfCHPR has the authority to hear the case and whether the application meets the necessary legal criteria.
This hearing is poised to set a precedent for interstate cases before the African Court, with potential ramifications for regional stability and international law enforcement in Africa.
Why This Case Matters
The outcome of this case could shape the future of conflict resolution and human rights enforcement on the continent. It highlights the role of regional judicial bodies in holding states accountable for their actions and ensuring justice for affected populations.
A Rare Interstate Dispute Before the African Court
This case stands out as one of the few instances of interstate disputes between African Union member States. As a result, the jurisdiction the African Court is called upon to exercise in this matter extends beyond its usual human rights jurisdiction, which typically involves disputes between individuals and states.
The case offers a unique opportunity to observe the Court’s interpretation of general international law principles, which are expected to play a crucial role in this proceeding. Notably, this case echoes the previous Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (New Application: 2002) brought by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) against Rwanda before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In that instance, the ICJ declined jurisdiction, as none of the jurisdictional grounds relied upon by the DRC were sufficient to establish the Court’s authority over Rwanda.
This new application before the African Court will be closely watched, as it may set an important precedent for how interstate disputes are handled within Africa’s legal framework.
Stay tuned for further updates as the African Court navigates this critical case that could redefine interstate litigation in Africa.

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Before It Becomes ECO-WAS

Guest — Sun, 02 Feb 2025 10:19:48 +0000

Before It Becomes ECO-WAS
Center for Community Law

By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu*
In the aftermath of the announcement on 28 January 2024 by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger Republic denouncing the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and leaving the regional bloc “without delay”, reactions spanned the spectrum from hubris to hyperbole. From Nigeria, the regional anchor and chair of the Community, the predominant sentiment was – “the three countries would have more to lose.”
Outside the continent some described the situation as “West Africa’s ‘Brexit’ moment” or Sahelexit, likening it to Britain’s decision in 2016 to quit the European Union (EU). Reinforcing the comparison, the finalization this past week of the exit of the three countries from ECOWAS coincided with the fifth anniversary of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU. The temptation to read too much into this coincidence should be resisted.
It is significant that the announcement by the three ECOWAS frontier states in 2024 was made shortly after the arrival in France of Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu for what was said to be a “private visit”. All three countries have been involved in a plurinational dispute involving both Nigeria and France and connected with military rule and transitions to elected government.
In reality, however, the disputes have been more about the historical legacies of French colonial rule, the complex insecurity in the Sahel, and Nigeria’s regional role. In their joint statement, the three countries accused ECOWAS of being “under the influence of foreign powers and betraying its founding principles.”
These were not allegations to be treated lightly. There was also significance to the fact that the announcement came on the eve of ECOWAS’ golden jubilee year and represented the latest escalation in the debate about how to calibrate inter-state relations in an increasingly complex regional environment.
It did not have to end this way. As a matter of law and notwithstanding the peremptory language deployed, the departure declaration by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in 2024 denouncing the ECOWAS Treaty was not immediate. Article 91(1) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty requires departing countries to “give to the Executive Secretary (President of the Commission) one year’s notice in writing” and their departure can only take effect at the end of the period.
ECOWAS had every opportunity during this period to exert itself to show it desired a different outcome. In the end, the Community appeared manifestly incapable of sustaining two contradictory ideas. One is the strategic importance of good neighbourliness within ECOWAS as a regional community of sovereign peers; the other is the commitment to government founded on democratic legitimacy.
The fact that ECOWAS finds itself in the current predicament ostensibly over the fate of elective government in the region is a somewhat, perverse acknowledgement of how far it has advanced since its origins.
Of the 15 heads of state and government present at the adoption of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States in May 1975, seven were military rulers and another six were succeeded by soldiers. Felix Houphöuet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire was the only president among the original signatories who was neither a soldier nor directly succeeded by one, but his successor was toppled by the military in December 1999. Abdou Diouf, who represented Senegal at the adoption ceremony was a Prime Minister to President Leopold Senghor, whom he later succeeded as president on 1 April 1981.
Cape Verde and Senegal remain the only ECOWAS countries to have been spared the experience of military rule. This fact should ordinarily have equipped the Community and its member states with adequate skills in reacting to military coups. However, it would be a mistake to suppose that this denouement is the result of an argument over coups alone or mostly.
ECOWAS began life in the middle of the global energy crisis of the 1970s, founded by rulers who declared it their goal to “foster and accelerate the economic and social development of our states, to improve the living standards of our peoples.” A combination of misrule and debt overhang miscarried this objective even before the ink was dry on the parchment it was written on.
In the wake of the instability that followed, the Community adjusted its mission in 1981 to include mutual defence and security, importing an implicit obligation of regional solidarity. When the Mano River countries, first Liberia and then Sierra Leone, descended into war from 1989, Nigeria, then led by military ruler, Ibrahim Babangida, launched a regional intervention known as ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990.
A review of the original ECOWAS Treaty followed in 1993, chaired by Nigeria’s former military ruler, Yakubu Gowon, himself the prime mover behind the original ECOWAS vision. The Revised ECOWAS Treaty again enhanced the obligations of mutual solidarity among the countries of the sub-region.
As the anchor country in ECOWAS, Nigeria was naturally expected to bear much of the burden of financing this obligation. But a straitened economy at the end of decades of misrule has frustrated that capability on the part of Nigeria at precisely the time that the countries of the Sahel needed its presence the most in response to Islamist insurgencies.
The resulting vacuum has been filled by external actors. The French proved to be the worst enemies in their attempt to fill this vacuum, providing the soldiers who seized power in these countries with a common foil. French departure in November 2022 and regional isolation by ECOWAS have proved to be a boon to Russia which has quickly built up assets and relations with the regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
Notionally, the departure of these three countries will cost ECOWAS 54.35% of its landmass, 20% of its sovereign membership, 16.5% of its population and seven per cent of its GDP. The actual costs are incalculable. First, Mali and Niger, which are landlocked, have been historic buffers between the violence of the Sahel and the Maghreb on the one hand and the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea on the other. Their departure could create new security exposures.
Second, the informal economies of West Africa depend significantly on these countries. Trade, migration and pilgrimage routes traverse through them, and the impact on the poor and the excluded who rely on these informal routes could either prove to be prohibitive or expose the hollowness of the region’s inter-state borders in legitimacy and meaning in the lives of ordinary people.
Third, the three countries are important for civil aviation in West Africa for overflights. If they were to deny these, ticketing and routing into their southern neighbours could also become prohibitive.
The upshot in a region defined by notoriously porous borders and transnational communities is that severing ties could be easier said than done. Even now, there is still a reason not to give up hope: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger retain their membership of the CFA Franc Zone in the West African Economic and Monetary Union, UEMOA, five of whose members remain in the ECOWAS.
ECOWAS has put a brave face on its diminution, claiming that its institutional doors remain open to these countries but their Alliance of Sahel States (AES) is up and running. The feeling remains inescapable that this outcome was not foregone and that it has been enabled by high-level ineptitude among the leadership of ECOWAS.
Ghana’s new president John Mahama, has in a practical manner made it a priority to advance rapprochement with the AES countries, by appointing a personal envoy to lead this process. The Community should fully support him.
It is impossible not to contemplate what might have been. Over the past year while the imminence of these losses escalated, Nigeria’s President and Chairperson of ECOWAS, Bola Tinubu, has been to France on numerous occasions. Consider what might have been if he found time to engage and personally visit these West African neighbours. Surely, that was a mission fit for a new presidential jet.
*A lawyer & a teacher, Odinkalu can be reached at chidi.odinkalu@tufts.edu

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Jittery Junta Leaders and Compelling Needs for ECOWAS Unity

Guest — Wed, 29 Jan 2025 09:07:40 +0000

Jittery Junta Leaders and Compelling Needs for ECOWAS Unity
Center for Community Law

By Paul Ejime*

Ahead of the 29 January 2025 deadline for their self-imposed exit from ECOWAS, the junta leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the Alliance of Sahel States, AES, have become jittery, deploying every trick, including disinformation, misinformation and blackmail to deflect blame for the inevitable consequences and uncertainty of their military adventure.

ECOWAS leaders at their last Abuja summit in December 2024 warned the three countries that having served notice of their withdrawal from the regional bloc in January 2024, the separation will become effective 12 months later, according to the regional bloc’s relevant protocol. This is despite the grace period of six months mentioned in the summit Communique. After receiving official correspondence from the ECOWAS Commission on the summit’s decision, the juntas have gone into propaganda overdrive.

For context, Niger is a country that has benefitted and continues to reap from Nigeria’s generosity including infrastructural development such as the rail system, electricity supply and new road networks. When ECOWAS leaders toyed with the idea of using military force to restore constitutional order in Niger following the August 2023 military coup led by Gen. Abdourahamane Tchiani, Nigerians were among the strongest opponents of the move arguing that seven Nigerian states shared borders and affinity with Niger.

It is therefore ludicrous for Tchiani to be accusing Nigeria of collaborating with France to destabilise Niger. In reality, the three AES countries are landlocked, and the Tchiani-led junta has fallen out with authorities in Benin Republic, a neighbouring country. In addition to their border dispute, Niger no longer has access to the Benin port for its imports and this has resulted in severe hardship in Niger, charactised by scarcity of essential goods, run-away inflation, high unemployment, a dysfunctional healthcare system and avoidable deaths in hospitals.

Instead of addressing their domestic existential threats, coupled with criticism of human rights violations and intolerance of dissent, Tchiani and his colleagues in Mali and Burkina Faso are blaming outsiders for the humanitarian crisis they brought on their people.

ECOWAS might have made a mistake by attempting to use military force on Niger without exhausting other available options. However, military rule is an aberration in today’s World and the organisation has since changed tact, using diplomacy instead, to engage its four member States under military rule, including Guinea.

Yet, the three junta leaders are unyielding. Meanwhile, the appalling security situation, one of the reasons the military rulers gave for toppling the civilian governments has not improved. Armed groups are still inflicting heavy casualties on civilians and soldiers in the three countries.

The AES juntas claim to detest France, but their countries are still members of the Francophone West African Economic and Monetary Union, UEMOA, supported by Paris. They are also still using the franc CFA currency, controlled by the French Treasury.

It is interesting that after agreeing on new national passports that will not bear the ECOWAS insignia, the junta leaders have announced that ECOWAS citizens can visit their three countries without a visa, which is consistent with the ECOWAS 1979 free movement protocol, a case of eating their cake and having it.

ECOWAS at 50 this year, cannot claim to be perfect. One of its major problems is leadership at the national and regional levels. But just as a chain is as strong as its weakest link, an organisation is only as good/effective as its weakest member.

ECOWAS evolved from the ashes of military dictatorships, however, in the last 12 years, the malaise of sit-tight syndrome, state capture, indiscriminate altering of national constitutions, election rigging, stifling of opposition and personalisation of democracy” crept in.

Critics now see the regional economic bloc once praised for its track record in conflict management and resolution as a club of self-serving leaders lacking the political will to end “political or constitutional coups,” which are as dangerous if not deadlier than military coups. But the solution is not in more coups, civilian or military. Urgent collective and deliberate measures are required to arrest the slide in the interest and benefit of community citizens in the “ECOWAS of People”.

The statement credited recently to the Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey to the effect that Togo could join the AES countries, requires further interrogation since the Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe and his Senegalese counterpart Diomaye Faye are the ECOWAS envoys negotiating rapprochement with the AES group.

Is Faure running with the hare and hunting with the hound? Last year, his government carried out controversial changes to Togo’s constitution and conducted widely criticised legislative elections, believed to pave the way for his tenure elongation in violation of regional protocols. Togo has covertly offered the AES countries access to its Lome port and recently, all four countries had a joint military exercise. Could Togo’s reported plan to join the AES group, Faure’s ploy to pre-empt ECOWAS’ attempt to question his dodgy democratic credential Faure’s political ambition?

There is a strong anti-French sentiment in Francophone African countries linked to controversial colonial agreements including defence/military pacts, which the AES leaders are capitalising on for their populist dispositions. The agreements have nothing to do with ECOWAS, so it begs the question that the AES leaders are blaming the organisation for them.

To come clean of accusations of foreign influence/interference, ECOWAS must assert its independence and put its house in order but not succumb to blackmail. The organisation should innovate and reinvent itself to withstand emerging threats from the geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in international relations ecosystem.

ECOWAS leaders should be pulling together, including reaching an agreement on the term limit for the President/Prime Minister in Member States, to stop the tenure elongation syndrome haemorrhaging the organisation. They should deliver good governance and muster the political will to end political or constitutional coups and other causes/enablers of military coups.

Ghana’s new President John Mahama has named a Special Envoy to the AES countries. The Ghanaian leader should be encouraged to work within the ECOWAS system to prevent a further weakening of the organisation.

Also, Nigeria as the “big brother, regional power” and the current ECOWAS Chair, should step up to the plate and work with other leaders to champion the rescue and repositioning of ECOWAS.

Membership of a united ECOWAS provides unlimited opportunities for regional cooperation and development. ECOWAS/AES’ separation will unleash potential negative consequences on the population of the AES countries, including massive loss of jobs from the closure of Community institutions and humanitarian food reserve facilities. Also, there will be an end to the benefits of regional free trade scheme and the immediate recovery of more than US$273 million at the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) loans and liabilities.

A sudden exit from the ECOWAS Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA), will also make the AES countries vulnerable to the global Finance Action Task-force (FATF) sanctions, plus an end to regional security cooperation, shared intelligence and coordinated joint military operations, which will make the countries easy targets for more deadly attacks by terrorist and armed insurgency groups.

Addressing the media in Abuja on Monday 27 January, the Head of EU Delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS, Ambassador Gautier Mignot urged ECOWAS to reconsider its decision on the AES group.

“It is a decision that we regret because we strongly support West African integration. Splitting does not seem to us a good idea,” said the envoy, who cited the EU’s experience with Brexit, based on negotiation and dialogue.

The junta leaders should also take a cue from the EU official’s counsel, bearing in mind that they will be held accountable for the consequences of dragging millions of their compatriots into socioeconomic catastrophe and political uncertainty.

ECOWAS is only demanding that they respect regional protocols and honour their countries’ obligations and commitment to democratic principles instead of sticking to endless opportunistic political transition programmes designed for their self-perpetuation in power.

It is within the rights of AES nations to associate or pursue common goals, but not necessarily by quitting ECOWAS. Organisations such as the Mano River Union; Lake Chad Basin Commission/Authority, the Zone of Prosperity and UEMOA, are all members of ECOWAS.

*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communications*

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The Human and Economic Costs of Awaiting Trial

Centre for Community Law — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 19:54:29 +0000

The Human and Economic Costs of Awaiting Trial
Center for Community Law

The Centre for community law has instituted an action at the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice seeking several declarations from the court regarding the seeming indiscriminate and unreasonable use of awaiting trial to remand accused persons in custody in Nigeria.
Relying on several international instruments, the Centre’s main arguments are that awaiting trial breaches the several fundamental rights of the detainees, principally the right to presumption of innocence, which it grossly breaches in respect of those detainees who spend longer time in custody than they would have spent had they been tried and convicted for the offence for which they were charged.
Highlighting the report recently released by Nigerian Correctional Service, termed “the Summary of Inmate Population by Convict and Awaiting Trial Persons as at 23rd December 2024 Total Inmate Population”, the Centre argues that the use of awaiting trial to detain accused persons who are entitled to bail is a drain on the resources of the Nation in two ways. The first is that the budgetary allocation, which is grossly inadequate in the first place, for the welfare of the inmate is a clear misappropriation of resources that should have been used for developmental purposes. The second is that the economy, and indeed the rest of the population, would be denied the contributions of the detainees to the economy during the period of incarceration and even when they are eventually released, as they may not ever recover from the trauma of incarceration for the rest of their live, especially where they were wrongly accused.
For context, Nigerian Correctional Service “Summary of Inmate Population by Convict and Awaiting Trial Persons as at 23rd December 2024 Total Inmate Population” was revealed that:
The total prison population is (Seventy Nine Thousand, Two Hundred and Thirty Seven (79,237) inmates;
Out of (a) above, convicted inmates are only twenty six thousand, seven hundred and eighteen (26,718) inmates;
Out of (a) above, awaiting trial inmates are a whopping Fifty Two Thousand, Five Hundred and Nineteen (52,519) inmates.
Going by (a) to (c) above, the percentage of convicted inmates is 34% while that of are awaiting trial is 66%.
In the court processes signed by Benjamin O Ojumah, Esq of Pristinus Solicitors, Benin City, the Centre seeks, among others, a declaration that the actions of the Defendant and its agents in incarcerating accused persons without trying them within a reasonable time is a violation of the treaty obligations of the Respondent. It also seeks a declaration that Nigeria is in violation of its duty to prevent torture and to provide good governance for the people who are deprived of essential services to the tune of money used to maintain, in prison custody, individuals who should not be in prison but being on bail should be contributing their quota to economy of the Nation, are incongruous to the treaty obligations of the respondent. This bears in mind that many of the awaiting trial inmates are eventually discharged and acquitted but sometimes after they have spent a longer time in prison than the length of custodial punishment prescribed for the offence for which they are remanded.

@centre for community law

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530133841737248947

jedidiah — Sun, 19 Jan 2025 01:09:12 +0000

530133841737248947
Center for Community Law

530133841737248947

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