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Jittery Junta Leaders and Compelling Needs for ECOWAS Unity

Guest — Wed, 29 Jan 2025 09:07:40 +0000

Jittery Junta Leaders and Compelling Needs for ECOWAS Unity
Center for Community Law

By Paul Ejime*

Ahead of the 29 January 2025 deadline for their self-imposed exit from ECOWAS, the junta leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the Alliance of Sahel States, AES, have become jittery, deploying every trick, including disinformation, misinformation and blackmail to deflect blame for the inevitable consequences and uncertainty of their military adventure.

ECOWAS leaders at their last Abuja summit in December 2024 warned the three countries that having served notice of their withdrawal from the regional bloc in January 2024, the separation will become effective 12 months later, according to the regional bloc’s relevant protocol. This is despite the grace period of six months mentioned in the summit Communique. After receiving official correspondence from the ECOWAS Commission on the summit’s decision, the juntas have gone into propaganda overdrive.

For context, Niger is a country that has benefitted and continues to reap from Nigeria’s generosity including infrastructural development such as the rail system, electricity supply and new road networks. When ECOWAS leaders toyed with the idea of using military force to restore constitutional order in Niger following the August 2023 military coup led by Gen. Abdourahamane Tchiani, Nigerians were among the strongest opponents of the move arguing that seven Nigerian states shared borders and affinity with Niger.

It is therefore ludicrous for Tchiani to be accusing Nigeria of collaborating with France to destabilise Niger. In reality, the three AES countries are landlocked, and the Tchiani-led junta has fallen out with authorities in Benin Republic, a neighbouring country. In addition to their border dispute, Niger no longer has access to the Benin port for its imports and this has resulted in severe hardship in Niger, charactised by scarcity of essential goods, run-away inflation, high unemployment, a dysfunctional healthcare system and avoidable deaths in hospitals.

Instead of addressing their domestic existential threats, coupled with criticism of human rights violations and intolerance of dissent, Tchiani and his colleagues in Mali and Burkina Faso are blaming outsiders for the humanitarian crisis they brought on their people.

ECOWAS might have made a mistake by attempting to use military force on Niger without exhausting other available options. However, military rule is an aberration in today’s World and the organisation has since changed tact, using diplomacy instead, to engage its four member States under military rule, including Guinea.

Yet, the three junta leaders are unyielding. Meanwhile, the appalling security situation, one of the reasons the military rulers gave for toppling the civilian governments has not improved. Armed groups are still inflicting heavy casualties on civilians and soldiers in the three countries.

The AES juntas claim to detest France, but their countries are still members of the Francophone West African Economic and Monetary Union, UEMOA, supported by Paris. They are also still using the franc CFA currency, controlled by the French Treasury.

It is interesting that after agreeing on new national passports that will not bear the ECOWAS insignia, the junta leaders have announced that ECOWAS citizens can visit their three countries without a visa, which is consistent with the ECOWAS 1979 free movement protocol, a case of eating their cake and having it.

ECOWAS at 50 this year, cannot claim to be perfect. One of its major problems is leadership at the national and regional levels. But just as a chain is as strong as its weakest link, an organisation is only as good/effective as its weakest member.

ECOWAS evolved from the ashes of military dictatorships, however, in the last 12 years, the malaise of sit-tight syndrome, state capture, indiscriminate altering of national constitutions, election rigging, stifling of opposition and personalisation of democracy” crept in.

Critics now see the regional economic bloc once praised for its track record in conflict management and resolution as a club of self-serving leaders lacking the political will to end “political or constitutional coups,” which are as dangerous if not deadlier than military coups. But the solution is not in more coups, civilian or military. Urgent collective and deliberate measures are required to arrest the slide in the interest and benefit of community citizens in the “ECOWAS of People”.

The statement credited recently to the Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey to the effect that Togo could join the AES countries, requires further interrogation since the Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe and his Senegalese counterpart Diomaye Faye are the ECOWAS envoys negotiating rapprochement with the AES group.

Is Faure running with the hare and hunting with the hound? Last year, his government carried out controversial changes to Togo’s constitution and conducted widely criticised legislative elections, believed to pave the way for his tenure elongation in violation of regional protocols. Togo has covertly offered the AES countries access to its Lome port and recently, all four countries had a joint military exercise. Could Togo’s reported plan to join the AES group, Faure’s ploy to pre-empt ECOWAS’ attempt to question his dodgy democratic credential Faure’s political ambition?

There is a strong anti-French sentiment in Francophone African countries linked to controversial colonial agreements including defence/military pacts, which the AES leaders are capitalising on for their populist dispositions. The agreements have nothing to do with ECOWAS, so it begs the question that the AES leaders are blaming the organisation for them.

To come clean of accusations of foreign influence/interference, ECOWAS must assert its independence and put its house in order but not succumb to blackmail. The organisation should innovate and reinvent itself to withstand emerging threats from the geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in international relations ecosystem.

ECOWAS leaders should be pulling together, including reaching an agreement on the term limit for the President/Prime Minister in Member States, to stop the tenure elongation syndrome haemorrhaging the organisation. They should deliver good governance and muster the political will to end political or constitutional coups and other causes/enablers of military coups.

Ghana’s new President John Mahama has named a Special Envoy to the AES countries. The Ghanaian leader should be encouraged to work within the ECOWAS system to prevent a further weakening of the organisation.

Also, Nigeria as the “big brother, regional power” and the current ECOWAS Chair, should step up to the plate and work with other leaders to champion the rescue and repositioning of ECOWAS.

Membership of a united ECOWAS provides unlimited opportunities for regional cooperation and development. ECOWAS/AES’ separation will unleash potential negative consequences on the population of the AES countries, including massive loss of jobs from the closure of Community institutions and humanitarian food reserve facilities. Also, there will be an end to the benefits of regional free trade scheme and the immediate recovery of more than US$273 million at the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) loans and liabilities.

A sudden exit from the ECOWAS Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA), will also make the AES countries vulnerable to the global Finance Action Task-force (FATF) sanctions, plus an end to regional security cooperation, shared intelligence and coordinated joint military operations, which will make the countries easy targets for more deadly attacks by terrorist and armed insurgency groups.

Addressing the media in Abuja on Monday 27 January, the Head of EU Delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS, Ambassador Gautier Mignot urged ECOWAS to reconsider its decision on the AES group.

“It is a decision that we regret because we strongly support West African integration. Splitting does not seem to us a good idea,” said the envoy, who cited the EU’s experience with Brexit, based on negotiation and dialogue.

The junta leaders should also take a cue from the EU official’s counsel, bearing in mind that they will be held accountable for the consequences of dragging millions of their compatriots into socioeconomic catastrophe and political uncertainty.

ECOWAS is only demanding that they respect regional protocols and honour their countries’ obligations and commitment to democratic principles instead of sticking to endless opportunistic political transition programmes designed for their self-perpetuation in power.

It is within the rights of AES nations to associate or pursue common goals, but not necessarily by quitting ECOWAS. Organisations such as the Mano River Union; Lake Chad Basin Commission/Authority, the Zone of Prosperity and UEMOA, are all members of ECOWAS.

*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communications*

The post Jittery Junta Leaders and Compelling Needs for ECOWAS Unity appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Guest

ECOWAS Unravelling: Will Mahama’s 2nd Coming Be a Silver Lining?*

Centre for Community Law — Thu, 09 Jan 2025 17:10:17 +0000

ECOWAS Unravelling: Will Mahama’s 2nd Coming Be a Silver Lining?*
Center for Community Law

*By Paul Ejime*

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is 50 this year. However, for those who care about the future of the organisation once acclaimed as a trailblazer in regional economic integration, especially conflict management and resolution, the situation calls more for a deep reflection and introspection instead of popping Champagne cocks.

From the time when some of its member countries were under military dictatorships or with one rebel government in the bush and another in the state capital, ECOWAS managed to evolve to a period when all its 15 member States practised one form of democratic government or another.

For more than a decade after its formation on 28 May 1975 through the Treaty of Lagos, the organisation was seized with peace and security challenges involving sporadic conflicts and civil wars, beginning with the two civil wars in Liberia. Dozens of military coups also toppled elected governments.

On each occasion, ECOWAS leaders ensured there was an eventual return to constitutional rule, using regional instruments with the carrot and stick approach, including suspension of membership or imposition of sanctions on errant members where diplomacy failed.

But gradually, the regional leaders took their eyes off the ball, allowing unbridled alteration of national constitutions and election rigging for term elongation, gross violations of human rights, suppression of opposition and shrinking of the democratic space.

The democratic regression continued unabated, until 2020 when former Col now General Assimi Goita and his military colleagues led the coup that ousted the government of elected President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.

By the middle of 2023, the region had witnessed more than half a dozen putsches, the game changer being on 26 July 2023 in Niger, led by the head of the country’s presidential guard General Abdourahamane Tchiani, who has since proclaimed himself the leader of a new military junta. Niger thus joined Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso as ECOWAS countries now under military dictatorships.

Instead of using its tried and tested strategies in whipping wayward member States into line, ECOWAS leaders mismanaged the situation by jumping headlong into the fray, imposing sweeping sanctions and threatening the use of military force to restore constitutional rule in Niger. Newly elected Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu, who was still fighting legal battles to secure his election was made Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government.

Perhaps to reciprocate that gesture, he caused Nigeria to suspend electricity supply to neighbouring Niger, even though the bilateral power supply agreement was not covered under any ECOWAS protocol.

Apart from the unpopular decision to use force in Niger, which was later abandoned, the role of France and its Francophone African allies, especially Cote d’Ivoire during the division between ECOWAS and its three Sahelian States of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, did not help matters.

In December 2023, the three, called the Alliance of Sahel States, or AES, served notice of their intention to quit ECOWAS “immediately.”

ECOWAS has since realised its mistake and changed tact, adopting diplomacy and negotiations to woo back the three countries, which have adamantly dug in their heels,

At their last summit in Abuja last December, ECOWAS leaders still gave the junta leaders a six-month “cooling period” to reconsider their decision to pull their countries out of ECOWAS, failing which the separation would be deemed to have started in January 2025.

Barring last ditch efforts, the divorce could mark an unprecedented turning point in the history in ECOWAS and regional integration in Africa, with potential far-reaching consequences.

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all landlocked countries, have expelled the troops of former colonial power, France, and the anti-French sentiments, which the junta leaders are riding on for their populist stance, have continued to grow.

The Senegal government of President Diomaye Faye, the ECOWAS Chief negotiator charged with convincing the three renegade countries to return to the fold, has also told Paris to close the French military base in the West African country and so has Chad, a non-ECOWAS member State.

General elections are due in Cote d’Ivoire this year and in what is seen as political expediency, or “a pre-emptive strike,” President Alassane Ouattara has also announced a phased withdrawal of French troops from one of the bases in the country.

But to put issues in context, it is the citizens of the Francophone countries that are behind the anti-French sentiments. They started the movement, before the military juntas joined.

Critics are unconvinced about the junta leaders’ sincerity of purpose. A critical examination of their careers would show that they are all beneficiaries of the French system. Several years after they seized power, there is little or no progress in their political transition programmes.

In clear violation of regional and continental protocols, they have also indicated their intention to stand as candidates in elections for transition to civilian rule, which many consider a sign they are bent to perpetuate themselves in power and not “liberators” as they claim.

The three countries still belong to the eight-nation West African Economic and Monetary Union, UEMOA, set up by France, which are members of ECOWAS and using the CFA franc, controlled by the French Treasury. The juntas grouse with ECOWAS, could be that it is the only organisation pressuring them to return to constitutional rule.

Zimbabwe’s diplomat, Ambassador Arikana Chihombori-Qua, deserves much credit for consistently calling out the French for the “inhumane” colonial pacts it forced on leaders of former African colonies at independence. Through her, the outside world became aware that Paris was making some 500 billion dollars per year from the exploitation of Francophone Africa. Unsurprisingly, she was sacked from her role as the African Union’s representative to the United Nations in 2019.

In the assessment of ECOWAS’ performance, it is not all gloom and doom, but perhaps, the proverbial half-full or half-empty cup. However, the undeniable truth is that all is not well with the organisation. By its standards, ECOWAS has under-performed, particularly in the last decade.

In a dynamic world of shifting geopolitics and geostrategic ecosystem, with multilateralism yielding place to bilateral/unilateral pursuits and new nationalism, characterised by emerging global threats of terrorism, insurgencies, extremism, and the invasion of social media, disinformation/misinformation and fake news, it would be naive to expect ECOWAS to be static or immune to external influence/interference.

Organisations, such as the United Nations and even the European Union, which are reference points, experience a bad patch or “wilderness” period. But life coaches will tell you that ‘it is not how many times you fall, but your ability to rise from each fall that determines your strength, sustainability and future.’

Applying this maxim to ECOWAS, it is fair to say that while the organisation should be proud of its past achievements, such as the free movement of persons, goods and services, and the right to residence and establishment, the challenges and threats of regional disintegration are real and present.

While, pre- and immediate post-independent African leaders did the heavy lifting by ensuring that much of Africa and its people were emancipated from slavery and colonialism, many African countries are still dependent and contemporary African leaders have failed their people by being self-serving instead of giving meaning to the nominal independence of their countries.

For the wobbly ECOWAS, the worst-case scenario could be the eventual withdrawal of the three AES countries or the balkanisation of the economic bloc, which will be a major setback.

On a positive note, the presence of Burkina Faso’s junta leader Capt Ibrahim Traore at the inauguration of Ghana’s new President John Dramani Mahama on 7th January 2025 could be a silver lining. Ghana has demonstrated democratic maturity by successfully conducting the ninth cycle of general elections with the fourth peaceful transfer of power between ruling and opposition parties for 33 years since its return of the multiparty system in 1992.

For Mahama, it is a glorious comeback with an overwhelming victory of 56% vote and a commanding parliamentary majority, after a hung parliament and the best presidential outing since the country’s independence from Britain in 1957.

He could deploy his experience and work to bequeath indelible legacies to his country which prides itself as the Black Star of Africa. At the regional level, Mahama could also team up with his colleagues, particularly Nigeria’s President Tinubu to reposition and refocus ECOWAS on the dreams of its founding fathers.

Every organisation requires a pillar/leader, which ECOWAS has lacked over the past decade. Like their predecessors combined to galvanise other regional leaders to end the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Tinubu and Mahama owe their countries and the region the duty and responsibility to provide the necessary leadership that will prevent ECOWAS from disintegration. Tinubu as ECOWAS Chair was Guest of honour at Mahama’s inauguration.

*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communications*

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Celebrating 50 Years of ECOWAS: A Jubilee of Unity and Progress?

Centre for Community Law — Wed, 01 Jan 2025 23:46:14 +0000

Celebrating 50 Years of ECOWAS: A Jubilee of Unity and Progress?
Center for Community Law

The ECOWAS Authority has announced grand plans to celebrate the 50th anniversary of ECOWAS with pomp and pageantry across all member states throughout 2025. The celebration will commence in Ghana and culminate in Togo.
The festivities will span across all member States, with a special focus on Nigeria, home to the ECOWAS headquarters and General Yakubu Gowon, the last living Founding Father.
The Heads of State and Government of fifteen West African countries established the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by signing the ECOWAS Treaty on May 28, 1975, in Lagos, Nigeria. The Treaty of Lagos was signed by the Heads of State and Government of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Togo. Its mission was to promote economic integration across the region. Cabo Verde joined the Bloc in 1977, bringing its membership to sixteen. However, Mauritania, the only Arabic-speaking member, withdrew in December 2000, reducing the membership to fifteen. Mauritania recently signed a new associate-membership agreement in August 2017.
The 1975 Treaty has since been replaced by the Revised Treaty of 1993, which reformed several aspects of the Bloc. Notably, it strengthened ECOWAS’s stance on human rights by incorporating the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights into its legal system and reinforcing the ECOWAS Court.
Since its creation, ECOWAS’s membership has remained stable at fifteen, despite Mauritania’s exit. However, this stability is now threatened by the potential departure of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from the Bloc this January.
ECOWAS has faced challenges in achieving its core aim of integration. Despite significant accomplishments, particularly in the area of free movement, ECOWAS citizens often feel disconnected from the Bloc due to its limited relevance in their daily lives.
Hopefully, this celebration—an undoubtedly costly venture—will focus on the people, with a concerted effort to sensitize them to the core values of ECOWAS.
Hopefully, it would usher in an era of renewed cooperation for unity and progress in all areas of its competence.

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Nigeria makes the list of top 20 nationalities claiming asylum in the UK

Centre for Community Law — Sat, 21 Dec 2024 14:22:20 +0000

Nigeria makes the list of top 20 nationalities claiming asylum in the UK
Center for Community Law

A recent UK Home Office Data names Nigeria as among the top 20 nationalities claiming asylum in the UK. The data, which covers the period of 2010 to September 2024 shows that Nigeria is the 18th top nationality claiming asylum in the UK and the third in Africa, following Sudan and Eritrea.
Although Nigeria has always made the list of nationalities claiming asylum in the UK, the September 2024 number of 1,597 is a record high number, from the previous 2016 height of 1,158 asylum applications. For context, the data from 2010 to September 2024 shows the following: it was 798 applications in 2010; 732 in 2011; 959 in 2012; 931 in 2013; 899 in 2014; 917 in 2015; 1,158 in 2016; 1048 in 2017, 839 in 2018; 937 in 2019; 647 in 2020; 690 in 2021; 839 in 2022; 900 in 2023 and 1596 in September 2024.
There are numerous factors compelling individuals to flee their country of nationality. These “push factors” may include political turmoil, armed conflict, or severe human rights violations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines a refugee as “someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence.” Such individuals must have a “well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.” Refugees typically cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War, as well as ethnic, tribal, and religious violence, are primary causes of people fleeing their countries.
In modern times, those seeking asylum fall into a broader range of reasons than those traditionally used to define refugees. Factors such as hunger, poverty, and economic hardship – which more aptly categorize individuals as economic migrants-now drive immigration, even from relatively safe countries where return would not attract significant attention. However, since these would hardly qualify them for asylum, asylum seekers, irrespective of their individual push factor, yet claim asylum on allegation of political persecution, fear of violence or human rights violations.
For example, the severe human rights violations and conflicts in Eritrea and the civil war in Sudan likely account for the respective asylum-seeker numbers of 3,472 and 3,762 from these countries.
In Nigeria’s case, attributing the high numbers of asylum claims purely to conflict or severe human rights violations is more complex. Economic hardship and issues such as sexual orientation appear to be driving factors. The unprecedented rise in poverty and economic struggles in 2024 likely plays a significant role in the record-breaking number of asylum claims, making it challenging to link these figures solely to armed conflict or egregious human rights abuses.

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Ghana 2024 Elections, ECOWAS and AES Juntas

Centre for Community Law — Sun, 15 Dec 2024 14:57:12 +0000

Ghana 2024 Elections, ECOWAS and AES Juntas
Center for Community Law

By Paul Ejime

Ghana has pulled off another feat in democratic consolidation after successfully conducting a ninth round of generally peaceful Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. While democratic elections have become a norm in the country, the 2024 General Elections were distinct in various aspects that challenged the resilience of democracy, yet, Ghanaians rose to the occasion
Forty-eight hours after the poll, the Electoral Commission (EC) announced processed results from 267 out of 276 constituencies, and declared former President John Dramani Mahama, candidate of the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), as the winner and President-elect with 56.55% of the votes against 40.61% scored by the out-going Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia, the presidential fag-bearer of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP).
Indeed, less than 24 hours from the close of balloting, Vice President Bawumia had telephoned President-elect Mahama to concede defeat.
Also, following the declaration of the official results by EC, out-going President Nana Akufo-Addo congratulated Mahama on “his decisive victory” and invited him to a meeting to initiate the transition process.
There was no rocket science to it, but a matter of political actors respecting the will of the people. The two dominant political parties had agents in almost all the more than 40,000 polling stations, who monitored process and relayed polling results to their party data system for parallel vote collation/tabulation.
Like in most elections, the run-up to Ghana 2024 was not without political tension, misinformation, disinformation, fake news and hate speech, culminating in violent incidents in some Regions/Districts, with at least one or two reported deaths and injuries.
Even after the results of the presidential race were announced, shootings, looting and destruction of public and private properties were still reported in some volatile regions. Police reported some arrests and promised prosecution of culprits.
Similar post-election violence is not uncommon in Ghana, but it reached a crescendo in the 2020 elections when eight people were killed.
Some critics believe that the “unsatisfactory” handling of the 2020 election killings and the lack of public confidence in some public institutions, might have contributed to the government’s defeat at the poll. The other factors include economic hardship, allegations of official corruption, nepotism and “political arrogance” exhibited by some public officials.
Also, artisanal illegal gold mining, locally called “galamsey,” and its negative environmental consequences (including degradation of water bodies and destruction of forest reserves) have become a major political issue, with the two major political parties trading allegations over complicity.
Equally concerning were the menace of violent extremism and vigilantism or the use of thugs/private security agents by politicians, despite the existence of the Anti-Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 999 of 1999.
The combined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused severe economic disruptions across the globe, currency fluctuation and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has impacted food security for many African countries, have left the Ghanaian economy reeling out of control amid high inflation and unemployment, especially among the youth. Also, the country’s debt crisis and engagement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for economic recovery might have played a significant role in the outcome of the elections.
Akufo-Addo and Mahama, who will become Ghana’s 13^th President since the country’s independence from Britain in 1957, have now locked horns in four presidential battles with both emerging victorious on two occasions – (2012 and 2024 Mahama) and (2016 and 2020 Akufo-Addo).
The 2020 race produced a hung parliament with the two dominant parties having an equal number of MPs in parliament, and the opposition NDC producing the parliamentary Speaker for the first time in the country’s political history. The decision by four MPs to quit their parties and the Supreme Court’s order stopping the Speaker from declaring the MPs’ seats vacant had aggravated the political tension.
Ghana has 24 registered political parties. Thirteen (13) fielded presidential candidates, while fifteen (15) had candidates for the parliamentary elections, complemented by independents. Nonetheless, the ruling NPP and the opposition NDC remain the dominant parties, alternating control of political power three times in 32 years (2000, 2008 and 2016) and now in 2024.
According to the EC, 900,000 new eligible voters were added to the national voter’s register in 2024 bringing the total to 18,774.159 (15% higher than in 2020), in an estimated national population of 34.42 million.
In a marked departure from tradition, the 2024 political campaigns were more of a door-to-door affair than public rallies. The NDC’s stronghold is the Volta Region and parts of the North and Muslim community, while the NPP draws its majority following from the Akan ethnic group, mainly from the Ashanti and other Southern Regions.
Religion is not overly contentious in Ghana, but the 2024 poll tested the country’s religious tolerance. It was the first time in Ghana’s history that two candidates from the two major political parties, professing different faiths came from the same region, the North. Mahama is Christian and Bawumia a Muslim.
In the end, Mahama recorded a sweeping victory with a more than 1.5 million majority vote margin, the highest since 1992. There is no perfect election. However, Ghana has demonstrated that an electoral process, which is a multi-stakeholder responsibility is integral to the entrenchment of democratic culture, nurtured by strong and resilient institutions.
As the icing on the cake, Ghana, for the first time, also has its first elected female Vice President, Prof Nana Opoku-Agyemang, Mahama’s running mate in the 2024 elections.
Local and international election observers, including from ECOWAS, the African Union and the Commonwealth, and civil society organisations, were unanimous in their positive assessment of the outcome of Ghana’s latest elections, the professionalism of most actors, and the transparency of the electoral process bar the isolated violent incidents, which they captured in their reports with recommendations particularly on collation and results management for the relevant authorities to address.
Incidentally, the ECOWAS Election Observation Mission to Ghana was led by Nigeria’s former Vice President Namadi Sambo, while the West African Elders’ Forum was headed by his boss, former President Goodluck Jonathan. The fact that President Jonathan, with Sambo as his deputy, also telephoned then-candidate Muhammadu Buhari to concede defeat in Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election, just as Bawumia has done in Ghana, was not lost on the international community.
By and large, after the successful and peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections in Senegal and Liberia, the outcome of Ghana’s elections is a strong message that democracy, with all its flaws, is the way to go, by providing the people with the mechanism to periodically change leaders who fail to deliver.
The conversation on the credibility or transparency of elections remains open-ended, but a flawed election is not enough reason to jettison democracy.
With the January 2025 deadline fast approaching on the notice issued by the junta leaders of the Alliance of Sahel States, AES, to pull their countries – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS, the message from Accra is that it is never too late for a patriotic leader to do the right thing in the interest of the people.
The citizens of AES countries are going through severe socioeconomic hardship, insecurity and political isolation, which could only worsen, with an avoidable humanitarian disaster if their countries should unceremoniously quit ECOWAS.
ECOWAS might have made some mistakes in its approach to halt the wave of military incursions into politics in West Africa, but that is no justification for military coups or unconstitutional change of governments.
Since their withdrawal announcement, the junta leaders have made little to no progress on constitutional rules or implementation of their transition programmes. They should not vindicate the notion that they are opportunistic power grabbers.
For their part, ECOWAS leaders must put their house in order at the national and regional levels by ending bad governance, corruption, human rights violations, election rigging as well as “constitutional and ballot box coups.”
*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security and Governance Communications

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ECOWAS Dilemma, Despair and Hope

Guest — Fri, 02 Aug 2024 12:15:56 +0000

ECOWAS Dilemma, Despair and Hope
Center for Community Law

By Ali Ocheni

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the three Alliance of Sahel States, with the French acronym AES have so far rebuffed overtures from ECOWAS and the rest of the international community to return to the regional bloc after their threat to withdraw.
This has put the future of the ECOWAS grouping in doubt. The bad situation in the politically restive region with the military takeovers of civilian governments in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso, only got worse with the 26 July 2023 coup in Niger.
No doubt, ECOWAS has made tremendous progress with some laudable achievements since its formation through the May 1975 Treaty of Lagos. The achievements include its flagship 1979 Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Goods, Services and Right to Establishment, which allows community citizens visa-free movement and the right to stay in a country other than their own for 90 days.
In addition, community citizens are free to establish businesses and reside in other member States under liberal conditions. There are also the ECOWAS Passport and Biometric Identification Card Scheme, and the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme, which allows duty-free export of goods within the regional market of over 420 million people.
The official intra-ECOWAS trade hovers between 11% and 15%, but thanks to the large volume of informal trade by itinerant traders, Nigerian goods, for instance, have become common attractions in the markets of other ECOWAS member countries and vice versa.
ECOWAS membership has also enabled members to increase the volume of their products and services in the region, with Nigeria, the regional powerhouse, with more than half of the ECOWAS population and the biggest financier, contributing more than 60% of the ECOWAS annual budget.
ECOWAS has recorded the most progress in conflict prevention, resolution, management and maintenance of regional peace. It restored peace to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea and Guinea Bissau, among its member states challenged by conflicts.
ECOWAS has also achieved measurable success in regional infrastructure development such as the Lagos-Abidjan Highway, the West Africa Gas Pipeline and the electricity power and sustainable energy projects.
ECOWAS, as the most active of Africa’s eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs), is also expected to play a pivotal role in the success of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) project aimed at increasing the volume of continental trade and boosting economic development and industrialisation. Ghana, and ECOWAS member state, hosts the AfCTA Secretariat.
However, the future of ECOWAS is severely threatened by insecurity, characterised by terrorism, jihadist and separatist insurrections, renewed incursion of the military into politics and the AES decision to leave the regional bloc.
For more than a decade, political instability and insecurity have heightened in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger and the coups in those countries could be linked to instability in the Sahel, following the murder of Libyan leader Col. Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 in the French-led NATO intervention.
Subsequently, Mali became the epicentre of terrorist threats in the Sahel, from where armed groups spread into neighbouring ECOWAS states of Burkina Faso and Niger.
Gaddafi was able to engage the separatist Tuareg militia on a monthly salary when he was in power. After his death, the armed groups migrated and settled in large numbers with their weapons in northern Mali and Niger. Drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom and other violent crimes took hold of the ungoverned space.
Before long, the Tuaregs reignited their armed rebellion for the state of AZAWAD in Northern Mali. ECOWAS through its Early Warning system, informed Mali and Niger about this dangerous development and advised that the militiamen be disarmed, trained and integration into the society.
While Niger heeded this ECOWAS advice and took some measures, Mali was adamant, and instead, former President Amadou Toumani Toure, reportedly paid the returning militiamen millions of dollars for pacification.
With this development, Mali and its vast porous borders with seven other countries became a haven for the armed groups including Al Qaeda, ISIS and other terrorist groups from North Africa and the Middle East.
The armed groups provided fertile ground for criminals and drug barons and became so powerful to form a separate government in northern Mali, outside the control of successive Bamako governments.
Under that state of anarchy, Capt. Amadou Sanogo seized power in the 2012 military coup, but with the intervention of Nigeria, ECOWAS and France, the coup leader and his group were persuaded to leave office, paving the way for the 2013 election which brought President Mamadou Boubocar Keita to power. He was re-elected in 2018 but was toppled in another coup led by Col. Assimi Goita in 2020.
Other causes of the political crises in the ECOWAS region include bad governance, corruption, arbitrary change of national constitutions, vote rigging and human rights violations by the civilian leaders, who also failed to end insecurity in their countries.
These factors and the lust for political power by the coup makers led to the epidemic of military takeovers from the civilians in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger and compounded by the refusal of the junta leaders to abide by provisions of the ECOWAS 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.
The sanctions imposed on the junta-led countries and the threat by ECOWAS to intervene militarily to restore constitutional order in Niger did not go down well with coup makers.
The three AES countries accused ECOWAS of imposing inhumane sanctions and failing to assist them in fighting terrorism and insecurity. They also charged ECOWAS with deviating from its “founding principles and of being teleguided by foreign powers,” especially France.
Even after ECOWAS lifted the sanctions and pulled back on the military intervention in Niger, the three AES countries have remained adamant.
Ironically, the three countries are still members of the eight-nation West African Economic and Monetary Union, UEMOA, all members of ECOWAS, set up by France and also still using the franc CFA currency controlled by the French Treasury.
From the long transition timetables announced by the junta leaders with the provision that they will be eligible to contest in the transition elections to civilian rule, it is obvious that the soldiers are bent on perpetuating themselves in power while avoiding reprimand by ECOWAS.
They may have expelled troops from EU countries led by France, and America, but the three landlocked countries, considered among the poorest in the World have also embraced Russian troops in their territories.
Doubtless, the consequences of the exit of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS will affect integration and stability in West Africa and the Sahel regions, including potential impacts on the free movement of persons, goods, services and right to establishment.
The importance of the three in agriculture will also be felt – Niger is a key supplier of onions and Burkina Faso exports large quantities of tomatoes and other fruits and vegetables to the regional markets.
Another fallout will be potential exodus of citizens of the three states from the other ECOWAS member states with more than five million Malians, Burkinabes and Nigeriens in Côte d’Ivoire and many Nigeriens in Ghana, Togo and Benin, who may be forced to return home. The AES countries will lose millions of dollars of ECOWAS-negotiated trades and projects and could be forced to retaliate by expelling ECOWAS citizens from their territories.
Another consequence is that the AES states could enter into alliances with countries which might be unfriendly with ECOWAS, raising the danger of jeopardising regional security and integration.
Part of the security implication of the AES withdrawal is that the coastal states of ECOWAS could suffer the influx of terrorists from the Sahel and North Africa, further complicating the security situation in both regions.
Other benefits which the AES group could lose, include the withdrawal of their citizens working in ECOWAS institutions and their candidates seeking positions in international organisations such as the United Nations will no longer enjoy the usual ECOWAS consensual solidity and support.
While the AES countries insist on their immediate withdrawal from ECOWAS, the regional organisation is following its protocol which provides for a 12-month notice for withdrawal as happened with Mauritania, which served notice in 1999 and only left in 2000.
So, the opportunity is still available for both sides to engage to resolve their differences diplomatically, particularly with the decision by ECOWAS 7 July Summit in Abuja nominating the Presidents of Senegal, Benin and Togo as mediators to bring the three breakaway states back into the fold.
President Diomaye Faye of Senegal had already started the troubleshooting before his appointment, following his meeting with Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, the re-appointed Chairman of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government.
However, there is serious doubt if the Presidents of Benin and Togo who are nursing third-term ambitions and were absent at the Abuja Summit, would be effective on this assignment. Both countries are currently at loggerheads over retaliatory border closures threatening their diplomatic relations. Togo is also secretly collaborating with the junta-led countries.
One viable option for ECOWAS is to allow the AES countries to continue with their alliance while still members of ECOWAS. The three are still UEMOA members, and with ECOWAS membership.
Other precedents are members of the Mano River Union, the Co-Prosperity Alliance Zone of West Africa, and the Council of Understanding, Counsiel de l’Entente in French, all pursuing common goals and objectives while retaining their ECOWAS membership.
The three AES countries as ECOWAS member states also belonged to the EU-supported G-5 Group of Sahel nations fighting terrorism.
ECOWAS and the AES must prevent turning the region into a proxy war theatre, especially with foreign powers like Russia, China, Turkey and others hoovering to establish footholds in West Africa and the Sahel. Also, replacing one foreign power with another will not guarantee solution to the security problem serve the region’s interests.
ECOWAS and the AES leaders must be reminded that their countries will be more effective in protecting their interests as a collective instead of working in silos.
Now that the AES’ concerns regarding ECOWAS sanctions and the threat of military intervention in Niger have been lifted, the junta leaders must show good faith and convince critics that their decision to withdraw from ECOWAS is not solely to avoid scrutiny or for power grab.
Most importantly, coup makers should not be allowed to benefit from their unconstitutional change of government through self-succession.
Nigeria as the current Chairman should reassert its leadership in ECOWAS and lead by example.
ECOWAS leaders must take a serious look at the regional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and ensure a rule of thumb application and compliance with its provisions, especially the zero-tolerance for all unconstitutional changes of government.
Constitutional or political and ballot-box coups are as dangerous and condemnable as military coups, and all coups and other anti-democratic behaviour must be met with the same severe consequences if ECOWAS is to restore its dented integrity.
ECOWAS must ensure that member states respect and comply with regional protocols and uphold international standards and best practices of democracy and good governance.
Ambassador Ali Ocheni was Nigeria’s Consul General in Shanghai, People’s Republic of China and former Head of the ECOWAS National Office in the Nigerian Foreign Affairs Ministry.

The post ECOWAS Dilemma, Despair and Hope appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Guest

How Nigeria Added Territory Without War, Litigation Or Purchase: A Rejoinder

Centre for Community Law — Tue, 02 Jan 2024 23:48:37 +0000

How Nigeria Added Territory Without War, Litigation Or Purchase: A Rejoinder
Center for Community Law

Introduction

My attention has been drawn to an article credited to Garba Shehu, who was the Senior Special Assistant, Media and Publicity to President Muhammadu Buhari.
In the article Garba Shehu made a fundamental assumption or error that I believe needs to be corrected at no better time than now that Nigerians are becoming more conscious of the potential economic benefits of the maritime entitlement of the country. The recent creation of the Federal Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy and the approval of an extended Continental Shelf (CS) of 20 nautical miles (nm) for Nigeria must be credited for the increased awareness.
Garba Shehu’s article was widely circulated by Garba Shehu and published on online platforms, including the Punch of 29 December, 2023, Prime Business Africa of 29 December, 2023, the News Chronicle of 1 January, 2024. In Mr Shehu’s determination for the article to be widely read, it was again published by the Voice of Nigeria on 2 January, 2024. It is to this one that my attention has been drawn.
False Assumption
In the article, and as its titled suggests, Garba Shehu claimed that “Nigeria gained additional territory without war or conflict, litigation, or purchase, as has never happened before in her lifetime”. If the motive of Garba Shehu was to give credit to Buhari (though history shows that at least three former Presidents deserve to take credit for it), I should suppose he is at liberty to have his say. However, Garba Shehu needs to know that he erred badly on this one.
I recall one of my LLM classes on the law of the sea in 2018, where a similar statement ascribed to Garba Shehu was raised during a discussion on the nature of rights States acquire over the CS. I am sad to recall the time and efforts it took to disabuse the minds of the students of the misleading claim made by Mr. Shahu. I understand that this is not an area he may be vast in, but I can only hope that, going forward, Mr. Garba would be careful enough to check with experts in a field he is not vast in to avoid a situation where he would repeat the same mistake.
It is very alarming to see that Mr. Garba was confident enough to show that Buhari had been misled to make the same error in a speech that might well have been written for him by Mr. Garba Shehu. According to him, President Buhari had said: “I have always had a special interest in this project right from the first day I heard of it because this type of project where Nigeria will gain additional territory without conflict has never happened before in her lifetime. It is pleasing to know that most wars that have taken place in the world since time immemorial including present times, have always been territorial and Nigeria has this one and only chance to gain territory without war, litigation, or purchase”.
I am sorry to disappoint both Mr Shehu and the former President Buhari (respectfully) by assuring them that that day has not come and shall never come that Nigeria’s territory would extend to 220 nm from the relevant baseline. No country is entitled to ascribe the tile of “territory to the continental shelf”. From when the CS was first recognised as a legal concept in a conventional text in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf until the extant regime of the shelf created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, never has it been accepted that the CS is a territory capable of appropriation or acquisition by war, purchase, discovery or by any other means!
In my earlier intervention on the subject on 21 December, 2023, I made it clear that the only maritime zone a coastal State is entitled to treat as its territory is the territorial sea, which is only 12 nm from the relevant baseline (articles 2 and 3 of the UNCLOS). I would like to recommend both my earlier intervention and the UNCLOS to Mr Garba Shehu.
The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf
Factually speaking, the continental shelf, as understood by geographers and hydrographers is a species of platform physically extending from the territory of coastal States.The scientific concept of the CS is based on the realisation that the bottom of the sea is marked by a sort of great step almost always abrupt, which divides it into two quite distinct regions. The region extending from this step to the coast-line is called the ‘continental shelf’, while the other, much vaster, which extends beyond the continental shelf, is the abysmal region.The latter part is the part now designated as the Area for the benefit of all mankind as the common heritage of mankind (Articles 136 and 140 of the UNCLOS); and precluded from the jurisdiction of any State (articles 1 and 137 of the UNCLOS).
From a scientific viewpoint, therefore, the CS is only a physical fact that is associated with the territory of a coastal State by reason of the geographical configuration of the State’s maritime area, particularly the seabed, as it proceeds towards the deep seabed. This is completely different from the legal concept of the CS, though it bore a definition that was closely related to the scientific understanding by linking it more closely with the geographical configuration of a coastal State when it was first defined in article 1 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.This is not the place to discuss the problems the 1958 definition created, which resulted in the intervention of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the concept of natural prolongation in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
Following the extensive discussion of the concept during the negotiation stage of the UNCLOS and the development of customary international law (CIL) in the field, the 1958 definition was partly jettisoned for the extant definition that largely frees itself from geographical configuration of the coastal planes of the coastal State (article 76(1) of the UNCLOS). Unlike the 1958 Convention, the UNCLOS gives 200 nm continental shelf entitlement to each coastal State. The result of this is that, irrespective of the geographical deficiencies or extensiveness of the CS of a coastal State, all States are entitled to a 200nm distance of CS in the first instance.
The UNCLOS however recognises the need to compensate coastal States whose CS entitlement may become shortened should geography be completely jettisoned (article 76(4)). As a result, it recognises, based on the geography of the continental margin of a coastal State, an extended CS, the physical fact of which must be ascertained and confirmed by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). This, as pointed out in my earlier intervention on the subject, is the reason Nigeria had to go through the CLCS for approval of its entitlement to an extended CS.
The history of the CS shows that one of the controversies that the legal concept of the CS faced was the legal status to be ascribed to it in relation to the sovereignty of coastal States; principally, whether the concept of territory should be ascribed to it and thus reserved exclusively to the use of the coastal State and capable of appropriation The other side of this question was whether all States have equal right and interest in its use. In other words, whether it was capable of appropriation (res nullius) or subject to the common ownership of all States (re communis).
The Rights of a Coastal States over its Continental Shelf vis a vis other States
As confirmed in the UNCLOS, none of these arguments was favoured. Rather, the Convention completely removed the notion of a territory capable of appropriation from the legal conception of the CS and then found a middle ground between limited exclusive use of the zone in favour of coastal States and limited communality of the zone in favour of all States.
This is where article 77 of the UNCLOS comes in to give exclusive rights over the resources of the zone, (only) to coastal States with an unmistakeable exclusion of sovereignty (through acquisition) by article 77(3), which provides that “the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation”. The only other exclusive right granted coastal states is in article 80, the right to install artificial islands. This obviously questions the assumption of Shehu that a nation may have to go to war to have access to the CS.
To further ring-fence the zone from the sovereignty of any State, article 78 of UNCLOS (compared to its article 2(2)) also confirms the limited rights ascribed to coastal States over the zone. As a further confirmation of the preclusion of sovereignty, as against the holistic rights ascribed to the territorial sea of coastal States, article 78 preserves the rights of all other States (coastal and landlocked) to the use of the superjacent waters over the CS for navigation purposes (and even for the purpose of exploitation and exploration of the resources of the waters in the case of an extended CS that is not coexistent with the Exclusive Economic Zone of the coastal State or of any other State); article 78 also reserves the airspace over the shelf for the use of all States.
For balance, the purposes for which other States are permitted to use the CS of coastal States are clearly spelt out in article 79 of the UNCLOS.
Nigeria has no Territorial Entitlement over her Continental Shelf
Thus, contrary to what Garba Shehu assumes, beyond the territorial sea, neither Nigeria nor any other coastal State has the faculty to claim, as its territory, any zone of the sea that appertains to it by reason of being a coastal State. Undoubtedly, the CS is not capable of appropriation as a territory. What Nigeria has acquired is the right to exploit and explore the resources of the additional 20nm (extended continental shelf) and to create an artificial Island, should it desire to do that. Those are the only rights Nigeria can enjoy to the exclusion of all other States in the zone. Above all, Nigeria still has to make payments to the International Seabed Authority for the resources it takes out of the zone (article 82 of the UNCLOS), unless exempted by article 82(3).
It is even incongruous to reason and antithetical to the weight of sovereignty for a sovereign State to be under obligation to make payments to another entity for use of the sovereign State’s territory or not to have exclusive use of the territory.
Amos O Enabulele is a professor of public international law and director general of the Centre for Community and Oceanic Law
@Centre for Community & Oceanic Law, January, 2024

The post How Nigeria Added Territory Without War, Litigation Or Purchase: A Rejoinder appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Centre for Community Law

What the Extended Continental Shelf Means for Nigeria

Centre for Community Law — Thu, 21 Dec 2023 12:27:17 +0000

What the Extended Continental Shelf Means for Nigeria
Center for Community Law

Amos O Enabulele

The Goal
The news that Nigeria’s application for an extended Continental Shelf (CS) has been granted to the breadth of 20 Nautical Miles (nm) by the Commission on the Limit of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), was bound to provoke the excitement it has provoked amongst experts on the law of the sea. Beyond the excitement, the real question now should be what Nigeria stands to benefit from the additional 20nm. This requires some thoughts on the preparedness of Nigeria to benefit from its overall maritime entitlements.
The Zones
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), being a coastal State, Nigeria is entitled to exercise its national jurisdiction (article 1(1) of the UNCLOS) over four zones: the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the CS and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). By the clear provision of the UNCLOS, reflecting customary international law (CIL), Nigeria is entitled to exercise sovereignty over the seabed, subsoil, the superjacent waters and the air column over 12 nautical miles from the relevant baseline along its coast – the Territorial Sea (articles 2 and 3 of the UNCLOS). This is the only zone that appertains to Nigeria by reason of her territorial sovereignty. The other three zones are derived from the rights accorded coastal States by the law of the sea for the specific purposes for which the zones were created and granted (article 77(3)).
Categories of Rights
Accordingly, while Nigeria can exercise its absolute rights within its territorial sea, subject to the right of innocent passage (article 17 of the UNCLOS), it can only exercise the limited sovereign rights allowed it by the law of the sea in the other zones. The contiguous zone (article 33 of the UNCLOS), which is 24nm from the same relevant baseline is for prevention and punishment of infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within Nigeria’s territory or territorial sea. Nigeria is entitled to exercises its sovereign right over the EEZ, covering 200 nm of the superjacent waters from the same relevant baseline (articles 55-57). It is also entitled to exercise sovereign right over the CS (article 76), generally covering 200 nm of the seabed and subsoil from the same relevant baseline. Both the EEZ and CS are mainly economic in nature and Nigeria is only permitted to exercise exclusive rights over the resources of the zones with due regards to the protection of the marine environment from pollution and to the rights of all other States to use the zones for other purposes. This invariably means that Nigeria can exercise enforcement powers, but only those that are required to enjoy its rights and fulfil its duties in the zone.
As the focus of this piece is on the Nigeria CS, we shall now tailor the discussion along that line.
The Continental Shelf
The term “continental shelf” bears different definitions depending on whether it is being defined by a geologist or a lawyer. To the geologists, “the continental shelf” is that part of the continental margin which is between the shoreline and the shelf break or, where there is no noticeable slope, between the shoreline and the point where the depth of the superjacent water is approximately between 100 and 200 metres. To a lawyer, it is as defined in article 76 of the UNCLOS, that:
the continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the submerged prolongation of the land territory of the coastal State – the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance….
There is what I would call, the default CS (200nm from the relevant baseline) which every coastal state is entitled to, as distinct from the extended CS, which some coastal States are entitled to by reason of the geographical configuration of the coastal platforms. By reason of paragraphs 4 to 9 of article 76, coastal States with naturally prolonged continental margin could establish an extended CS up to 350nm. However, unlike the delimitation of other maritime boundaries, the extended CS is not a unilateral act of State sovereignty – Fisheries case, (United Kingdom v. Norway), ICJ Rep 1951, 116, 132 – in that a State whose natural prolongation qualifies it for the extension, can do so only on the approval; of the CLSC (article 76(8)).
This explains why Nigeria and all other States that have extended CS had to apply to the CLCS for verification and approval of their entitlement. Whatever additional limits the CLSC determines a State is due is then added to the default 200 nm entitlement of each coastal State. This is capped at an additional 150nm for extended CS, for an overall 350nm of a combination of the default and the extended. By reason of the additional 20nm, therefore, Nigeria now has an overall CS 220nm in that area of the Western part of the Gulf of Guinea.
The Commission on the Limit of the Continental Shelf
Detailed provisions on the CLCS are contained in Annex II to the UNCLOS. Article 3 of the Annex stipulates the functions of the Commission to be:
(a) to consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles, and to make recommendations in accordance with article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 August 1980 by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; and
(b) to provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State concerned during the preparation of the data referred to in subparagraph (a).
The CLCS is the vehicle which implements the UNCLOS regime on the establishment of the outer limits of the CS beyond 200 nautical miles from the relevant baselines of a deserving coastal State.
The Long Road to Nigeria’s Extended Continental Shelf
In accordance with article 76, paragraph 8, of the UNCLOS, Nigeria submitted its application for an extended CS to the CLCS on 7 May 2009. It was first presented to the twenty-fourth session of the Commission on 28 August, 2009, by a delegation led by the then Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Michael Aondoakaa. Other members of this historic delegation were Aliyu Omar, Director, National Boundary Commission, U. Joy Ogwu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, and a number of scientific, legal and technical advisers.
One remarkable point made by Mr. Aondoakaa at the point of presentation was that the submission was made without prejudice to maritime boundary delimitation with neighbouring States with opposite or adjacent coasts. This was a clear indication that the Governments of neighbouring States will not pose any obstacles to the implementation of article 76 on the part of Nigeria. He hinged this assurance on a meeting held under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Accra, Ghana, from 24 to 26 February 2009. That meeting had been attended by representatives from Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo, who reached the common understanding that “[i]ssues of the limit of adjacent/opposite boundaries shall continue to be discussed in a spirit of cooperation to arrive at a definite delimitation even after the presentation of the preliminary information/submission. Member States would, therefore, write ‘no objection’ note to the submission of their neighbours”.
The CLCS established a subcommittee to look into the application at its 39^th session in 2015, which considered the submission in its 39^th and 40^th sessions and raised some questions which led Nigeria to conduct a new geophysical survey in the Gulf of Guinea. On 18 September, 2016, Nigeria submitted an amendment to its earlier submission.
The approval of extended continental shelf entitlement for Nigeria followed the consideration of the recommendations of the Commission on the application of Nigeria on 11 August, 2023, sequel to the presentation of the of 8 August, 2023, by the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations and head of delegation, Tijjani Muhammad Bande. He was assisted by a technical adviser and member of the High-Powered Presidential Committee on the Continental Shelf, Lawrence Awosika; and a technical consultant with the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security at the University of Wollongong, Philip Symonds. The Commission deliberated on the recommendations and approved it with amendments on 11 August 2023.
ECOWAS Community’s Share of Extended CS
Nigeria is not the only ECOWAS State that has claimed an extended CS. Ghana submitted an application on 8 April, 2009; Côte d’Ivoire submitted its application on May 8, 2009; the Republic of Cabo Verde, the Republic of The Gambia, the Republic of Guinea, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, the Republic of Senegal and the Republic of Sierra Leone, submitted a joint application on 25 September 2014;  the Republic of Liberia submitted an application on 23 October 2018; the Republic of Benin and the Togolese Republic also submitted a joint application on 21 September 2018.
Interestingly, that of Ghana was approved as far back as 2014, and that of Côte d’Ivoire was approved on 2020. Earlier in the year, being concerned over the delay of the Nigerian application, the Centre for Community and Oceanic Law contacted the Secretariat of CLCS on 31 May, 2023, to ascertain the state of Nigeria’s application. This enquiry was responded to by the CLSC’s Principal Legal Officer, who provided the Centre some helpful guidance on the matter on 14 June, 2023.
What is in it for Nigeria
The CS is a warehouse of resources, including huge oil and gas deposit. By article 77 of UNCLOS, Nigeria exercises over the continental shelf, sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. These consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil. By article 81, Nigeria has the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on its CS as well as to install artificial islands and engage in other economic activities (article 80, read together with article 60)
As Nigeria has now acquired sovereign rights over an additional 20nm of CS, the CS area over which it can now perform or authorise these activities has been extended, from 200nm to 220 nm, as a result. The exclusivity of the rights is further emphasised by article 77(4), which makes the sovereign rights to explore and exploit exclusive to Nigeria in the sense that if Nigeria does not explore Nigeria’s CS or exploit its natural resources, no other State may undertake these activities without the express consent of Nigeria.
It is however, not all about rights, there are also obligations which Nigeria must be minded to fulfil, not least of which is the overarching duty to protect the marine environment. Nigeria is also under obligation to make annual payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of the CS beyond its original 200 nautical miles, except if it is shown that Nigeria is a net importer of a mineral resource produced from its CS in which case it will be exempt from making such payments or contributions in respect of that mineral resource.
Minimising the impact of extended CS on the Area
It is essential to remark that the ocean floor assumes differing nomenclatures and bestows different category of rights as it proceeds seawards. What is referred to as the seabed and subsoil of the territorial sea over which a coastal State has sovereignty is what progresses into the CS over which a coastal State exercises only limited rights described as sovereign rights; and it is the same that progresses into the deep ocean floor of abysmal region known as the Area. The area is reserved for all mankind as the common heritage of mankind (Articles 136 and 140 of the UNCLOS). It is defined in article 1 as “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” because it is not subject to the sovereignty or the control of any State (article 137 of the UNCLOS). Its resources belong to all mankind and to be shared to all States – coastal or landlocked.
There is a clear relationship between the extended CS and the Area in the sense that were the institution of extended CS not created, all the ocean floor beyond 200nm would naturally fall within the Area. It appears that it is in recognition of the fact that extended CS removes from the Area that coastal States with extended CS are obligated to make the contributions mentioned previously. This is more so as the contributions are required to be made through the Authority to distribute to State Parties to the UNCLOS on the basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of developing States, particularly the least developed and the land-locked among them. The Authority is the body saddled with the responsibility to govern the Area and its resources.
The End
In the final analysis, it is difficult to be very optimistic that Nigeria would take full advantage of the extended continental shelf as quickly as it should. This is because the manner Nigeria has so far managed its oil and gas resources hardly inspire any confidence. It is however possible to be hopeful that the creation of the Federal Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy would not just be only in words but also in action to be seen in measurable achievements. It is expected that would urgently complete the process and commence licencing and exploration activities in the zone. I cannot omit to stress the benefit of cooperation and collaboration between opposite and adjacent States in this regard. The ECOWAS platform is a ready platform to be used to galvanise efforts towards a better utilization of the blue resources of the region. It is yet to be seen how ECOWAS has taken advantage of the fact that twelve – Benin, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo – out of its 15 member States are coastal States and all twelve coastal States have submitted applications to the CLCS for a share of an extended CS. The ECOWAS Accra, Ghana meeting of 24 to 26 February, 2009, that paved the way for a no-objection extended continental shelf application by ECOWAS States has shown that such cooperation is needed and possible. These States should pull resources together to develop a strong blue economy and safe ocean for the community.
Amos O Enabulele is a Professor of Public International Law and DG, Centre for Community & Oceanic Law

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Is Nigeria Really Ready to Attract Foreign Investments?

jedidiah — Wed, 22 Nov 2023 23:23:56 +0000

Is Nigeria Really Ready to Attract Foreign Investments?
Center for Community Law

Since President Tinubu took over the reins of government of the Nigerian State on 29 May, 2023, there has been at least three major ventures unto foreign lands across many seas – remarkably, Indian, Germany, Saudi Arabia – to seek foreign investments.
The message of the President has been that Nigeria is ready for business with great efforts at hitting all the right notes. The problem with all such efforts is that they achieve the exact opposite when what these investors see are different from what the President wants them to be. They will simply see the President as an unserious and the country, unprepared for business.
Leaving aside our difficult problems of endemic corruption (or perception of corruption) and insecurity (or maybe perception of insecurity) for a moment, the Centre for Community Law decided to take a quick look at what ordinarily is a low hanging fruit, which happens to be the first point of contact with countries, businesses and even individuals in modern times, just to ascertain how prepared, really, the President and his team are, and indeed Nigeria is, for business. How prepared?
We made a quick tour of the State House website, only to find shocking and embarrassing revelations that would put off investors. How would investors view a country where unelected individuals to whom the constitution of Nigerian assigned no constitutional roles are listed as as members of the Nigerian cabinet? That is what you find on the State House Website, which named the President’s wife and the Vice President’s wife alongside the President and his Vice under the “people” and “cabinet” tab, as officers of the Nigerian State. It cannot even be explained that an official website is now the most fitting place to advertise the spouses of elected office holders. This clear abuse of official powers or privileges is not what serious investors like to see.
Apart from that, the website is hardly functional and grossly out of date. The “presidential aides” tab is non-responsive, when you click on it. Just go to the “policy” tab, and click on the items there to see that they have not been updated since Tinubu came into office. One vivid example and indeed a big embarrassment is “Council and Committee”. Just click on it, and boom, Gen. Buhari is still our president; and the EMT is still chaired by Mr. Osinbajo. It is even obvious from the individuals on this page, that this has not been updated since 2015, yet billions of Naira is budgeted for the State House annually. The ‘economy’ tab follows suit. This is not to mention the dirty naira notes displayed on the site for the whole world to see.
What really is responsible for this? Is it laziness on the part of officials? We cannot but wonder what the overcrowded staff list of aides and junior aides, if you like, are doing with their time at the State House. Is being in the State House just for the luxuries or for service? This State House website is very uninspiring and unimpressive for a brand that is marketing itself to a seeming unwilling buyers.
We were even more embarrassed to find a very unfortunate statement on the site, saying that “the new Whistleblowing Policy introduced by the Federal Ministry of Finance yielded, within its first two months of operation, yielded $160m and N8 billion in recoveries of stolen Government funds”. While it is easy to know that this is from the Buhari era (little wonder why Nigeria had zero FDI in 2022), it is difficult to understand why such a statement is yet on the site as at today. The State House should not take it upon itself to announce to the world that government officers are stealing government funds. Would genuine investors be impressed? We do not think so!
Perhaps, we missed it, but despite our best efforts, we were unable to see a website containing a full and authentic list of the President and his ministers – the constitutionally recognised cabinet – other than the unlawfully constituted four person cabinet on the State House website.
Maybe, Nigeria should take a cue from other countries like South Africa and India that have a comprehensive website on the officials of the State. The importance of this cannot be overemphasised, given the fact that people are now technologically wired to seek information from websites when contemplating whether to engage the entity.
This is at all not the problem of the President, who cannot be blamed for the lapses. Matters of this nature are the exact reasons why the President has officials of the State who are paid to save the President and indeed the entire country from embarrassments by looking after the “little things” while the President is doing the hard work of convincing investors to invest in the country. May the lapses of the loads of advisers and aides parading the corridors of the State House not sabotage the President’s hard work!
We must give kudos to the Ministers who are on top of their game in this regard. Our random sample of the websites of ministries revealed that the websites have been updated since the Ministers took office. This is however, not enough to satisfy curious investors, who would also like to see that there are prompt responses to inquiries made through the website, especially those relating to freedom of information, which is the first test of transparency and open government. It’s time to get it right as the regional power that Nigeria is!

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The Worth of ECOWAS When Nigeria Picks Up Crumbs

Centre for Community Law — Tue, 07 Nov 2023 11:57:03 +0000

The Worth of ECOWAS When Nigeria Picks Up Crumbs
Center for Community Law

Nigeria is unarguably the biggest power within the ECOWAS Community, unless that this is gradually becoming the biggest only in terms of size, population and untapped resources. Unfortunately, Nigeria now seems to score first in unpalatable statistics, such as those on corruption, wastefulness, poverty, illiteracy, insurgency, out of school children, etc.

This cannot but impact, as we are seeing, the ability of ECOWAS to fulfil its mandate. A situation, where, as the below World Bank data shows, Nigeria is in the least enviable position, is very unhelpful to the Community, particularly to its ability to achieve economic convergence. Nigeria, which ought to be the member State that provides the right incentives to smaller member States in economic, social, security and political spheres, is obviously now unable to do that when it boasts the lowest life expectancy and the least (but one) destination for Foreign Direct Investment (among other bottom levels) in the ECOWAS Community.

We have decided to highlight only two of the indices that set Nigeria out as the member State to be mainly worried about at this time, especially as its President is also the Chair of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and Government.

Generally, there is an urgent need for all Heads of States and Government to show the capacity to deal with the myriads of problems that the Community is facing: except the Heads of States and the other government functionaries, who continue to live ostentatious and wasteful lifestyles, Community Citizens are been driven into multi-dimensional poverty on a daily basis.

Perhaps, now is the time to for the Heads to re-channel the energies they invest into punishing the entire citizens of a member State by way of sanctions and denial of electricity in the event of a coup. Those energies should be rechanneled to economic and other developmental issues; they should make good governance, the rule of law and human rights protection, their main priority, and ensure their policies and actions convergence on those factors.

As earlier mentioned, the two statistics we have lifted from the World Bank are those relating to life expectancy and foreign direct investment, both of which are defined below.

Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is divided by GDP.

Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life time.


1	Benin:	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 60 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) – 1.5 (2022)
2	Burkina Faso	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 59 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) – 0.6 (2022)
3	Cabo Verde	Life expectancy at birth, total (years), 74 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) – 5.3 (2022)
4	Cote d’Ivoire	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 59 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) – 2.3 (2022)
5	Ghana	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 64 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP): 2.0 (2022)
6	The Gambia	Life expectancy at birth, total (years): 62 (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP): 10.4 (2022)
7	Guinea Bissau	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 60 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) – 1.3 (2022)
8	Guinea	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 59 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP): 3.1 (2022)
9	Liberia	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 61 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP): 1.8 (2022)
10	Mali	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 59 years (2021
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP): 1.3 (2022)
11	Niger	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 62 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP): 4.2 (2022)
12	Nigeria	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 53 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP -0.0
13	Senegal	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 67 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP): 9.3 (2022)
14	Sierra Leone	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 60 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP): 6.3 (2022)
14	Togo	Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – 62 years (2021)
		Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) – 2.8 (2022)

Centre for community law, November, 20233

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