Education | Center for Community Law

President Boakai Reinstates Liberia’s Electoral Chief

Guest — Fri, 21 Feb 2025 18:24:50 +0000

President Boakai Reinstates Liberia’s Electoral Chief
Center for Community Law

By Paul Ejime*
President Joseph Boakai has reinstated Madam Davidetta Browne-Lansanah as Chairperson of Liberia’s National Elections Commission (NEC) one month after her “indefinite” suspension from the post.
According to an Executive Mansion statement on 15 January 2025, her suspension had followed an investigation into recent protests by aggrieved NEC workers regarding “administrative decisions taken by the NEC Chairperson without proper consultation.”
Madam Browne-Lansanah was accused of “unilaterally announcing the closure of the NEC office for one month and dismissing 25 employees without the knowledge or approval of the NEC Board of Commissioners, as required by law.”
However, in a vindication of Madam Browne-Lansanah, a new government statement on 20th February said the lifting of the suspension was “with immediate effect,” following a high-level meeting on 18th February “attended by the NEC Board of Commissioners, the ECOWAS Ambassador to Liberia, and senior officials of the Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs.”
In administrative language, an indefinite suspension of a public servant is usually followed by dismissal, but informed sources said, “nothing untoward or unprofessional” was found against Madam Madam Browne-Lansanah.
According to the sources, “some politicians within the corridors of power might have tried to use NEC insiders to undermine the authority of a woman described as “rugged, strong-willed and independent-minded.”
Madam Browne-Lansanah received local and international praise for delivering a successful and one of Liberia’s most credible and transparent presidential and legislative elections in October 2023.
She was reported to have clashed with some commissioners last year over administrative matters resulting in the dismissal of some employees for “gross insubordination.”
This led to protests by some employees at the NEC headquarters in Monrovia.
Under the Liberian constitution, the NEC chairperson’s role is tenured, and Madam Browne-Lansanah’s term runs out in two years.
Liberia’s Rule of Law Legislative Caucus had described her suspension as “unconstitutional,” affirming that “NEC’s independence, protected under the Constitution, is vital to safeguarding democracy” in the country.
“The Supreme Court of Liberia has ruled unequivocally that the suspension of tenured officers is tantamount to their removal. Such removals are constitutionally permissible only through the impeachment process, which involves, the National Legislature,” the Caucus added.
It urged the “President to rescind (his) decision and allow constitutional processes to prevail,” adding: “The erosion of institutional independence risks plunging the country into uncharted territory and threatens the very essence of our democracy.”
To his credit, President Boakai has allowed the rule of law to prevail, with Madam Browne-Lansanah’s reputation intact.
In lifting the suspension, the president expressed the hope that the “uncertainty surrounding the NEC has been addressed, clearing the way for the smooth conduct of the upcoming Nimba County by-election to fill the vacancy left as a result of the passing of Senator Prince Yormie Johnson.”
The NEC was part of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended Liberia’s14-year civil war. It replaced the 1986 Elections Commission as “an autonomous government institution, independent of any branch of government with powers to run elections in Liberia.”
According to Chapter 2, Section 2.1 of the New Elections Law of 2014, the NEC “shall be under the direction and management of seven (7) Commissioners appointed by the President of Liberia, who shall appoint one of them as Chairman and another as Co-Chairman. All of the appointments shall be subject to the consent of the Senate.”
Madam Browne-Lansanah is the fifth NEC Chairperson. In 2011, one of her predecessors, James Fromayan was forced to step down after being accused of bias by then-opposition leader George Weah.
The same George Weah, as President, appointed Madam Browne-Lansanah as NEC Chair in April 2020 and lost his re-election bid in the 2023 elections conducted by her.
A veteran broadcast journalist with a master’s degree in public administration and bachelor’s degrees in political science and public administration, Madam Browne-Lansanah also boasts some career experience working in the UN system before joining NEC 10 years ago as a commissioner.
She served as Co-Chair and Acting Chairperson before assuming the substantive position of Chairperson in 2020, pledging to “strengthen NEC’s core values of independence, integrity, professionalism and consistency.”
At a time when the ECOWAS region is grappling with the resurgence of military incursions in politics, badly run elections and three member States on the verge of quitting the 15-nation organisation, Liberia, Senegal and lately Ghana, hold up hope for survival of electoral democracy
*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communication*

The post President Boakai Reinstates Liberia’s Electoral Chief appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Guest

In Defence of Judicial Authority in Nigeria

Guest — Sun, 16 Feb 2025 22:08:58 +0000

In Defence of Judicial Authority in Nigeria
Center for Community Law

By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu*

“The judiciary… has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment.” – Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 78.
In January 1983, a suspicious fire incident did considerable damage to NECOM House, the high-rise building in Lagos that housed the headquarters of the country’s telecommunications monopoly, then known as the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited, NITEL. Alhaji Shehu Shagari was in power as elected civilian president.
The belief was widespread that the fire was the handiwork of “senior officials in the building (who) had been under investigation for fraud and embezzlement that police estimated at more than US$100 million.”
The NECOM House fire was another in a succession of high-profile incidents with a whiff of arson affecting public infrastructure in the country. The previous month, another fire had consumed the Ministry of External Affairs, reportedly “set by accountants who were under investigation.”
Casualty count from the fire incident was substantial but uncertain.
By some coincidence, the fire occurred the week after the fire-fighting team at the facility had been inexplicably withdrawn. The response of the federal authorities was even more inexplicable.
The 21 persons whom they chose to prosecute in connection with the incident included Ray Ekpu, at the time a senior journalist and columnist, whose crime appeared to be that he published an article after the incident suggesting that it was arson.
Also charged were Adamu Akokhia, then-Chief Fire Officer of the Federation; and Saidu Garba, the Divisional Fire Officer responsible for the building. While they were suspects in pending criminal proceedings, the federal authorities also suspended Adamu Akokhia and Saidu Garba from work.
Saidu Garba sued at the High Court of Lagos State challenging his suspension. While his case was still pending, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, John Oyegun, issued a letter sacking him from the public service.
Informed of this development, the presiding judge, Yahaya Jinadu, summoned John Oyegun to appear before him and explain why he should not be held in contempt of court. The judge subsequently found Mr. Oyegun guilty of contempt, cautioned him and ordered him to withdraw the letter of termination issued to Saidu Garba while his case was pending.
Despite the forbearance of the court, Mr. Oyegun failed to comply. On 3 August 1984, the court ordered his lawyer to secure compliance by his client with the order or cease participation in the proceedings until he complied.
By this time, Major-General Muhammadu Buhari was in his eighth month in power as military ruler, having overthrown Shagari.
Five days later, on 8 August, then Chief Judge of Lagos State, Adetunji Adefarasin, summarily withdrew the case file from Yahaya Jinadu and reassigned it to himself, claiming that he did so at the request of the trial judge. Yahaya Jinadu denied ever having made such a request to the Chief Judge.
While Yahaya Jinadu was on pilgrimage to Mecca shortly thereafter, the Advisory Judicial Committee (AJC), then chaired by Chief Justice Sodeinde Sowemimo (the same one who infamously convicted Obafemi Awolowo two decades earlier), constituted a committee “that curiously condemned his actions and asked him to make written and verbal apologies” to, among others, the federal attorney-general, the President of the Court of Appeal, and the Chief Judge of Lagos State. Unwilling to abide an order which he characterised as “humiliation and disgrace of the judiciary”, Yahaya Jinadu served the statutory sixty-day notice of his intention to resign as a judge. In response, the military regime terminated his judicial career summarily.
For being acutely aware of the duty to conserve the currency of judicial authority and being prepared to defend that, Yahaya Jinadu paid a heavy price with his career. Those who traduced him set in motion a deadly corrosion of judicial authority whose inter-generational consequences today endanger the very foundations of both the institution and the country.
Two contemporaneous events this past week dramatized how badly so.
Addressing judges at the beginning of the week at a continuing judicial education event in Abuja, the Federal Capital, Chief Justice of the Federation, Kudirat Kekere-Ekun, complained about deepening public distrust of the judiciary, reminding her colleagues that “it is not enough to be impartial; we must also be seen to be impartial. The perception of bias or impropriety can be as damaging as the reality itself.”
At about the same time as the Chief Justice uttered them, these sentiments were on trial at another end of town. The Federal High Court in Abuja was the venue of the now viral contretemps between Nnamdi Kanu, self-proclaimed leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPoB), on the one hand; and the presiding judge, the lead prosecutor, and even his own team of lawyers, on the other. If anything was more troubling than the conduct of Mr. Kanu in that outing, it was the self-inflicted lack of judicial authority to firmly put a stop to it.
To be sure, there are ample provisions in the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) empowering courts to preserve their authority or act against the disruption of their proceedings. A judge for a quarter of a century and a state attorney-general before that, the one charge that cannot possibly be made against the presiding judge in this case is inexperience. So, why was the court, nevertheless, so craven?
On 24 September 2024, Justice Binta Nnyako had ruled in respect of the same proceedings concerning Mr. Kanu that: “The root of adjudication is confidence. The defendant has no confidence in this court.
Consequently, I hereby recuse myself from this trial and hereby remit the case file to the Chief Judge for further necessary action.” Three weeks later, it was reported that the Chief Judge decided administratively to overrule the trial judge’s recusal and return the case file to her.
There are, however, two problems with this decision.
First, as a matter of law, the Chief Judge may be a first among his peers but he is no paramount chief at large. His powers do not extend to administratively overruling a written decision of a judge sitting as such. Second, as a practical matter, a judge who by her own hand rules to recuse herself from proceedings after affirming cratered confidence in her handling of the proceedings cannot allow herself to be bullied or inveigled into attempting to ingest her judicial vomit.
The coincidence of these two developments almost assuredly denied the court of its constitutive authority, making it a passenger in that piece of execrable judicial theatre.
The standard under the 1999 constitution is that a court shall be constituted “in such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.”
A judge cannot return to claim impartiality and independence after having gone on record to recuse herself for having lost the confidence of the defendant. A forum in that setting hardly deserves the appellation of a court.
Nigeria’s 1999 constitution speaks loosely of “judicial power”. The traditional tools of power in this sense are coercive or transactional. As a fact, the judiciary lacks both. Its currency is neither arms nor money. Rather it is reason and authority.
To the extent that it is possible to salvage anything from the wreckage of those proceedings in that Federal High Court last week, it is the importance of holding the feet of the judiciary to fire when any judge – no matter how high – acts in a manner that casually endangers that authority. The costs of not doing so are incalculable.
*A lawyer and teacher, Odinkalu can be reached at chidi.odinkalu@tufts.edu*

The post In Defence of Judicial Authority in Nigeria appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Guest

African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Hear Landmark Case Between DRC and Rwanda

Centre for Community Law — Tue, 11 Feb 2025 19:01:23 +0000

African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Hear Landmark Case Between DRC and Rwanda
Center for Community Law

A historic legal battle is set to unfold as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) prepares to hear a crucial case between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Rwanda. Scheduled for February 12 and 13, 2025, at the Court’s seat in Arusha, Tanzania, this case marks a significant milestone in the pursuit of justice and accountability in Africa.
Background of the Case
On August 21, 2023, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Applicant State) filed an application against Rwanda (Respondent State), citing severe human rights violations. The claims are based on multiple legal frameworks, including:
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
The Protocol to the African Charter on Women’s Rights
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
At the core of the allegations are human rights violations linked to the ongoing armed conflict in eastern DRC since 2021. The conflict, involving the DRC’s armed forces and the M23 rebel group, has been exacerbated by alleged backing from Rwanda.
Key Allegations
The DRC contends that Rwanda’s actions have led to:
Massacres and occupation of several territories
The displacement of over 520,000 people
A cholera epidemic due to poor sanitary conditions in displaced populations
The destruction of schools, depriving 20,000 children of education
Widespread damage to infrastructure, including power facilities, homes, health centres, and agricultural land
The harbouring of individuals accused of serious crimes, despite international arrest warrants issued against them
In response, the DRC is seeking a court ruling that holds Rwanda accountable, orders the withdrawal of its alleged support for M23, and mandates reparations for victims and damages caused by the conflict.
Rwanda’s Defence and Court Proceedings
Rwanda has challenged the Court’s jurisdiction over the matter and questioned the admissibility of the case. Consequently, the upcoming public hearing will focus on determining whether the AfCHPR has the authority to hear the case and whether the application meets the necessary legal criteria.
This hearing is poised to set a precedent for interstate cases before the African Court, with potential ramifications for regional stability and international law enforcement in Africa.
Why This Case Matters
The outcome of this case could shape the future of conflict resolution and human rights enforcement on the continent. It highlights the role of regional judicial bodies in holding states accountable for their actions and ensuring justice for affected populations.
A Rare Interstate Dispute Before the African Court
This case stands out as one of the few instances of interstate disputes between African Union member States. As a result, the jurisdiction the African Court is called upon to exercise in this matter extends beyond its usual human rights jurisdiction, which typically involves disputes between individuals and states.
The case offers a unique opportunity to observe the Court’s interpretation of general international law principles, which are expected to play a crucial role in this proceeding. Notably, this case echoes the previous Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (New Application: 2002) brought by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) against Rwanda before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In that instance, the ICJ declined jurisdiction, as none of the jurisdictional grounds relied upon by the DRC were sufficient to establish the Court’s authority over Rwanda.
This new application before the African Court will be closely watched, as it may set an important precedent for how interstate disputes are handled within Africa’s legal framework.
Stay tuned for further updates as the African Court navigates this critical case that could redefine interstate litigation in Africa.

The post African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Hear Landmark Case Between DRC and Rwanda appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Centre for Community Law

Jittery Junta Leaders and Compelling Needs for ECOWAS Unity

Guest — Wed, 29 Jan 2025 09:07:40 +0000

Jittery Junta Leaders and Compelling Needs for ECOWAS Unity
Center for Community Law

By Paul Ejime*

Ahead of the 29 January 2025 deadline for their self-imposed exit from ECOWAS, the junta leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the Alliance of Sahel States, AES, have become jittery, deploying every trick, including disinformation, misinformation and blackmail to deflect blame for the inevitable consequences and uncertainty of their military adventure.

ECOWAS leaders at their last Abuja summit in December 2024 warned the three countries that having served notice of their withdrawal from the regional bloc in January 2024, the separation will become effective 12 months later, according to the regional bloc’s relevant protocol. This is despite the grace period of six months mentioned in the summit Communique. After receiving official correspondence from the ECOWAS Commission on the summit’s decision, the juntas have gone into propaganda overdrive.

For context, Niger is a country that has benefitted and continues to reap from Nigeria’s generosity including infrastructural development such as the rail system, electricity supply and new road networks. When ECOWAS leaders toyed with the idea of using military force to restore constitutional order in Niger following the August 2023 military coup led by Gen. Abdourahamane Tchiani, Nigerians were among the strongest opponents of the move arguing that seven Nigerian states shared borders and affinity with Niger.

It is therefore ludicrous for Tchiani to be accusing Nigeria of collaborating with France to destabilise Niger. In reality, the three AES countries are landlocked, and the Tchiani-led junta has fallen out with authorities in Benin Republic, a neighbouring country. In addition to their border dispute, Niger no longer has access to the Benin port for its imports and this has resulted in severe hardship in Niger, charactised by scarcity of essential goods, run-away inflation, high unemployment, a dysfunctional healthcare system and avoidable deaths in hospitals.

Instead of addressing their domestic existential threats, coupled with criticism of human rights violations and intolerance of dissent, Tchiani and his colleagues in Mali and Burkina Faso are blaming outsiders for the humanitarian crisis they brought on their people.

ECOWAS might have made a mistake by attempting to use military force on Niger without exhausting other available options. However, military rule is an aberration in today’s World and the organisation has since changed tact, using diplomacy instead, to engage its four member States under military rule, including Guinea.

Yet, the three junta leaders are unyielding. Meanwhile, the appalling security situation, one of the reasons the military rulers gave for toppling the civilian governments has not improved. Armed groups are still inflicting heavy casualties on civilians and soldiers in the three countries.

The AES juntas claim to detest France, but their countries are still members of the Francophone West African Economic and Monetary Union, UEMOA, supported by Paris. They are also still using the franc CFA currency, controlled by the French Treasury.

It is interesting that after agreeing on new national passports that will not bear the ECOWAS insignia, the junta leaders have announced that ECOWAS citizens can visit their three countries without a visa, which is consistent with the ECOWAS 1979 free movement protocol, a case of eating their cake and having it.

ECOWAS at 50 this year, cannot claim to be perfect. One of its major problems is leadership at the national and regional levels. But just as a chain is as strong as its weakest link, an organisation is only as good/effective as its weakest member.

ECOWAS evolved from the ashes of military dictatorships, however, in the last 12 years, the malaise of sit-tight syndrome, state capture, indiscriminate altering of national constitutions, election rigging, stifling of opposition and personalisation of democracy” crept in.

Critics now see the regional economic bloc once praised for its track record in conflict management and resolution as a club of self-serving leaders lacking the political will to end “political or constitutional coups,” which are as dangerous if not deadlier than military coups. But the solution is not in more coups, civilian or military. Urgent collective and deliberate measures are required to arrest the slide in the interest and benefit of community citizens in the “ECOWAS of People”.

The statement credited recently to the Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey to the effect that Togo could join the AES countries, requires further interrogation since the Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe and his Senegalese counterpart Diomaye Faye are the ECOWAS envoys negotiating rapprochement with the AES group.

Is Faure running with the hare and hunting with the hound? Last year, his government carried out controversial changes to Togo’s constitution and conducted widely criticised legislative elections, believed to pave the way for his tenure elongation in violation of regional protocols. Togo has covertly offered the AES countries access to its Lome port and recently, all four countries had a joint military exercise. Could Togo’s reported plan to join the AES group, Faure’s ploy to pre-empt ECOWAS’ attempt to question his dodgy democratic credential Faure’s political ambition?

There is a strong anti-French sentiment in Francophone African countries linked to controversial colonial agreements including defence/military pacts, which the AES leaders are capitalising on for their populist dispositions. The agreements have nothing to do with ECOWAS, so it begs the question that the AES leaders are blaming the organisation for them.

To come clean of accusations of foreign influence/interference, ECOWAS must assert its independence and put its house in order but not succumb to blackmail. The organisation should innovate and reinvent itself to withstand emerging threats from the geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in international relations ecosystem.

ECOWAS leaders should be pulling together, including reaching an agreement on the term limit for the President/Prime Minister in Member States, to stop the tenure elongation syndrome haemorrhaging the organisation. They should deliver good governance and muster the political will to end political or constitutional coups and other causes/enablers of military coups.

Ghana’s new President John Mahama has named a Special Envoy to the AES countries. The Ghanaian leader should be encouraged to work within the ECOWAS system to prevent a further weakening of the organisation.

Also, Nigeria as the “big brother, regional power” and the current ECOWAS Chair, should step up to the plate and work with other leaders to champion the rescue and repositioning of ECOWAS.

Membership of a united ECOWAS provides unlimited opportunities for regional cooperation and development. ECOWAS/AES’ separation will unleash potential negative consequences on the population of the AES countries, including massive loss of jobs from the closure of Community institutions and humanitarian food reserve facilities. Also, there will be an end to the benefits of regional free trade scheme and the immediate recovery of more than US$273 million at the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) loans and liabilities.

A sudden exit from the ECOWAS Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA), will also make the AES countries vulnerable to the global Finance Action Task-force (FATF) sanctions, plus an end to regional security cooperation, shared intelligence and coordinated joint military operations, which will make the countries easy targets for more deadly attacks by terrorist and armed insurgency groups.

Addressing the media in Abuja on Monday 27 January, the Head of EU Delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS, Ambassador Gautier Mignot urged ECOWAS to reconsider its decision on the AES group.

“It is a decision that we regret because we strongly support West African integration. Splitting does not seem to us a good idea,” said the envoy, who cited the EU’s experience with Brexit, based on negotiation and dialogue.

The junta leaders should also take a cue from the EU official’s counsel, bearing in mind that they will be held accountable for the consequences of dragging millions of their compatriots into socioeconomic catastrophe and political uncertainty.

ECOWAS is only demanding that they respect regional protocols and honour their countries’ obligations and commitment to democratic principles instead of sticking to endless opportunistic political transition programmes designed for their self-perpetuation in power.

It is within the rights of AES nations to associate or pursue common goals, but not necessarily by quitting ECOWAS. Organisations such as the Mano River Union; Lake Chad Basin Commission/Authority, the Zone of Prosperity and UEMOA, are all members of ECOWAS.

*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communications*

The post Jittery Junta Leaders and Compelling Needs for ECOWAS Unity appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Guest

The Human and Economic Costs of Awaiting Trial

Centre for Community Law — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 19:54:29 +0000

The Human and Economic Costs of Awaiting Trial
Center for Community Law

The Centre for community law has instituted an action at the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice seeking several declarations from the court regarding the seeming indiscriminate and unreasonable use of awaiting trial to remand accused persons in custody in Nigeria.
Relying on several international instruments, the Centre’s main arguments are that awaiting trial breaches the several fundamental rights of the detainees, principally the right to presumption of innocence, which it grossly breaches in respect of those detainees who spend longer time in custody than they would have spent had they been tried and convicted for the offence for which they were charged.
Highlighting the report recently released by Nigerian Correctional Service, termed “the Summary of Inmate Population by Convict and Awaiting Trial Persons as at 23rd December 2024 Total Inmate Population”, the Centre argues that the use of awaiting trial to detain accused persons who are entitled to bail is a drain on the resources of the Nation in two ways. The first is that the budgetary allocation, which is grossly inadequate in the first place, for the welfare of the inmate is a clear misappropriation of resources that should have been used for developmental purposes. The second is that the economy, and indeed the rest of the population, would be denied the contributions of the detainees to the economy during the period of incarceration and even when they are eventually released, as they may not ever recover from the trauma of incarceration for the rest of their live, especially where they were wrongly accused.
For context, Nigerian Correctional Service “Summary of Inmate Population by Convict and Awaiting Trial Persons as at 23rd December 2024 Total Inmate Population” was revealed that:
The total prison population is (Seventy Nine Thousand, Two Hundred and Thirty Seven (79,237) inmates;
Out of (a) above, convicted inmates are only twenty six thousand, seven hundred and eighteen (26,718) inmates;
Out of (a) above, awaiting trial inmates are a whopping Fifty Two Thousand, Five Hundred and Nineteen (52,519) inmates.
Going by (a) to (c) above, the percentage of convicted inmates is 34% while that of are awaiting trial is 66%.
In the court processes signed by Benjamin O Ojumah, Esq of Pristinus Solicitors, Benin City, the Centre seeks, among others, a declaration that the actions of the Defendant and its agents in incarcerating accused persons without trying them within a reasonable time is a violation of the treaty obligations of the Respondent. It also seeks a declaration that Nigeria is in violation of its duty to prevent torture and to provide good governance for the people who are deprived of essential services to the tune of money used to maintain, in prison custody, individuals who should not be in prison but being on bail should be contributing their quota to economy of the Nation, are incongruous to the treaty obligations of the respondent. This bears in mind that many of the awaiting trial inmates are eventually discharged and acquitted but sometimes after they have spent a longer time in prison than the length of custodial punishment prescribed for the offence for which they are remanded.

@centre for community law

The post The Human and Economic Costs of Awaiting Trial appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Centre for Community Law

ECOWAS Unravelling: Will Mahama’s 2nd Coming Be a Silver Lining?*

Centre for Community Law — Thu, 09 Jan 2025 17:10:17 +0000

ECOWAS Unravelling: Will Mahama’s 2nd Coming Be a Silver Lining?*
Center for Community Law

*By Paul Ejime*

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is 50 this year. However, for those who care about the future of the organisation once acclaimed as a trailblazer in regional economic integration, especially conflict management and resolution, the situation calls more for a deep reflection and introspection instead of popping Champagne cocks.

From the time when some of its member countries were under military dictatorships or with one rebel government in the bush and another in the state capital, ECOWAS managed to evolve to a period when all its 15 member States practised one form of democratic government or another.

For more than a decade after its formation on 28 May 1975 through the Treaty of Lagos, the organisation was seized with peace and security challenges involving sporadic conflicts and civil wars, beginning with the two civil wars in Liberia. Dozens of military coups also toppled elected governments.

On each occasion, ECOWAS leaders ensured there was an eventual return to constitutional rule, using regional instruments with the carrot and stick approach, including suspension of membership or imposition of sanctions on errant members where diplomacy failed.

But gradually, the regional leaders took their eyes off the ball, allowing unbridled alteration of national constitutions and election rigging for term elongation, gross violations of human rights, suppression of opposition and shrinking of the democratic space.

The democratic regression continued unabated, until 2020 when former Col now General Assimi Goita and his military colleagues led the coup that ousted the government of elected President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.

By the middle of 2023, the region had witnessed more than half a dozen putsches, the game changer being on 26 July 2023 in Niger, led by the head of the country’s presidential guard General Abdourahamane Tchiani, who has since proclaimed himself the leader of a new military junta. Niger thus joined Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso as ECOWAS countries now under military dictatorships.

Instead of using its tried and tested strategies in whipping wayward member States into line, ECOWAS leaders mismanaged the situation by jumping headlong into the fray, imposing sweeping sanctions and threatening the use of military force to restore constitutional rule in Niger. Newly elected Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu, who was still fighting legal battles to secure his election was made Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government.

Perhaps to reciprocate that gesture, he caused Nigeria to suspend electricity supply to neighbouring Niger, even though the bilateral power supply agreement was not covered under any ECOWAS protocol.

Apart from the unpopular decision to use force in Niger, which was later abandoned, the role of France and its Francophone African allies, especially Cote d’Ivoire during the division between ECOWAS and its three Sahelian States of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, did not help matters.

In December 2023, the three, called the Alliance of Sahel States, or AES, served notice of their intention to quit ECOWAS “immediately.”

ECOWAS has since realised its mistake and changed tact, adopting diplomacy and negotiations to woo back the three countries, which have adamantly dug in their heels,

At their last summit in Abuja last December, ECOWAS leaders still gave the junta leaders a six-month “cooling period” to reconsider their decision to pull their countries out of ECOWAS, failing which the separation would be deemed to have started in January 2025.

Barring last ditch efforts, the divorce could mark an unprecedented turning point in the history in ECOWAS and regional integration in Africa, with potential far-reaching consequences.

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all landlocked countries, have expelled the troops of former colonial power, France, and the anti-French sentiments, which the junta leaders are riding on for their populist stance, have continued to grow.

The Senegal government of President Diomaye Faye, the ECOWAS Chief negotiator charged with convincing the three renegade countries to return to the fold, has also told Paris to close the French military base in the West African country and so has Chad, a non-ECOWAS member State.

General elections are due in Cote d’Ivoire this year and in what is seen as political expediency, or “a pre-emptive strike,” President Alassane Ouattara has also announced a phased withdrawal of French troops from one of the bases in the country.

But to put issues in context, it is the citizens of the Francophone countries that are behind the anti-French sentiments. They started the movement, before the military juntas joined.

Critics are unconvinced about the junta leaders’ sincerity of purpose. A critical examination of their careers would show that they are all beneficiaries of the French system. Several years after they seized power, there is little or no progress in their political transition programmes.

In clear violation of regional and continental protocols, they have also indicated their intention to stand as candidates in elections for transition to civilian rule, which many consider a sign they are bent to perpetuate themselves in power and not “liberators” as they claim.

The three countries still belong to the eight-nation West African Economic and Monetary Union, UEMOA, set up by France, which are members of ECOWAS and using the CFA franc, controlled by the French Treasury. The juntas grouse with ECOWAS, could be that it is the only organisation pressuring them to return to constitutional rule.

Zimbabwe’s diplomat, Ambassador Arikana Chihombori-Qua, deserves much credit for consistently calling out the French for the “inhumane” colonial pacts it forced on leaders of former African colonies at independence. Through her, the outside world became aware that Paris was making some 500 billion dollars per year from the exploitation of Francophone Africa. Unsurprisingly, she was sacked from her role as the African Union’s representative to the United Nations in 2019.

In the assessment of ECOWAS’ performance, it is not all gloom and doom, but perhaps, the proverbial half-full or half-empty cup. However, the undeniable truth is that all is not well with the organisation. By its standards, ECOWAS has under-performed, particularly in the last decade.

In a dynamic world of shifting geopolitics and geostrategic ecosystem, with multilateralism yielding place to bilateral/unilateral pursuits and new nationalism, characterised by emerging global threats of terrorism, insurgencies, extremism, and the invasion of social media, disinformation/misinformation and fake news, it would be naive to expect ECOWAS to be static or immune to external influence/interference.

Organisations, such as the United Nations and even the European Union, which are reference points, experience a bad patch or “wilderness” period. But life coaches will tell you that ‘it is not how many times you fall, but your ability to rise from each fall that determines your strength, sustainability and future.’

Applying this maxim to ECOWAS, it is fair to say that while the organisation should be proud of its past achievements, such as the free movement of persons, goods and services, and the right to residence and establishment, the challenges and threats of regional disintegration are real and present.

While, pre- and immediate post-independent African leaders did the heavy lifting by ensuring that much of Africa and its people were emancipated from slavery and colonialism, many African countries are still dependent and contemporary African leaders have failed their people by being self-serving instead of giving meaning to the nominal independence of their countries.

For the wobbly ECOWAS, the worst-case scenario could be the eventual withdrawal of the three AES countries or the balkanisation of the economic bloc, which will be a major setback.

On a positive note, the presence of Burkina Faso’s junta leader Capt Ibrahim Traore at the inauguration of Ghana’s new President John Dramani Mahama on 7th January 2025 could be a silver lining. Ghana has demonstrated democratic maturity by successfully conducting the ninth cycle of general elections with the fourth peaceful transfer of power between ruling and opposition parties for 33 years since its return of the multiparty system in 1992.

For Mahama, it is a glorious comeback with an overwhelming victory of 56% vote and a commanding parliamentary majority, after a hung parliament and the best presidential outing since the country’s independence from Britain in 1957.

He could deploy his experience and work to bequeath indelible legacies to his country which prides itself as the Black Star of Africa. At the regional level, Mahama could also team up with his colleagues, particularly Nigeria’s President Tinubu to reposition and refocus ECOWAS on the dreams of its founding fathers.

Every organisation requires a pillar/leader, which ECOWAS has lacked over the past decade. Like their predecessors combined to galvanise other regional leaders to end the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Tinubu and Mahama owe their countries and the region the duty and responsibility to provide the necessary leadership that will prevent ECOWAS from disintegration. Tinubu as ECOWAS Chair was Guest of honour at Mahama’s inauguration.

*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communications*

The post ECOWAS Unravelling: Will Mahama’s 2nd Coming Be a Silver Lining?* appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Centre for Community Law

Does Africa Have a January Problem?

Centre for Community Law — Sun, 05 Jan 2025 12:28:06 +0000

Does Africa Have a January Problem?
Center for Community Law

By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu*
Fifty-seven years ago, almost to the month, celebrated Kenyan political scientist, Ali Mazrui observed that “for some reason, a disproportionate number of the historic acts of violence in Africa since independence have tended to happen in the months of January and February.” He had good reason for this.
In January 1961, the Belgians and the Americans arranged to hand over to Moise Tshombe in Katanga, Patrice Lumumba, the inconvenient post-colonial Prime Minister of the country now known as the Democratic of Congo. The following month, the world learnt about the brutal fate that befell Lumumba. The Congo and, indeed Africa, have both paid a heavy price for those events.
Togo’s first president, Sylvanus Olympio, was killed in January 1963.
Two years later, in January 1965, Pierre Ngendandumwe, Burundi’s Prime Minister, was assassinated.
In the year before the assassination of Ngendandumwe, meanwhile, Uganda’s, John Okello, led the overthrow of Sultan Jamshid bin Abdullah in the very bloody Zanzibar Revolution. America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would later record with clinical economy that the effect of the revolution was that “the Arab regime of Zanzibar vanished in a single day as its leaders fled, died or were interned.”
The year after the assassination in Burundi, it was the turn of Nigeria’s Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa together with the regional premiers in the Northern and Western regions. The following month, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown while on his way to see Mao Tse Tung in Beijing, China.
Professor Mazrui never provided a dispositive answer to his question whether there is “any special reason why the opening months of January and February from year to year should have had such a disproportionate share of Africa’s great acts of turbulence.” Instead, he offered a telling insight, arguing that these events were the fallouts of the search for two forms of legitimacy essential to the trajectory of Africa after the colonial experience. One was the legitimacy of the state, and the other was the legitimacy of regimes or of rulers.
Nearly six decades later, these twin problems of state and regime legitimacy continue to afflict African countries, although the ways in which different countries now respond to them have arguably made our collective African Januaries a little more interesting.
In many countries, elections – rather than assassinations – have become the chosen path. In 2024, the people defenestrated ruling parties in Botswana, Ghana, Senegal, and even South Africa.
Namibia’s ruling party edged a contest that produced the country’s first female president in an act of political survival for the ruling SWAPO that may have postponed its day of electoral reckoning.
Of course, some of the elections during the year re-enacted familiar scenes from a discredited part in Africa’s history.
Tunisia’s election in October 2024 was arranged to re-select law professor and incumbent President Kais Saied, with 90.7% of the votes cast. It was like a scene from the period before the Arab Spring.
Since the turn of the millennium, however, most of Africa’s elections have been increasingly decided by court judges, not voters. In the latest example, in Mozambique, the ruling FRELIMO party procured a judicial validation of an election widely seen as heavily rigged in its favour. A country already ravaged by a murderous insurgency in its northern region of Cabo Delgado and a destructive cyclone must now live with self-inflicted ungovernability. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), in power since independence in 1966, made a different choice when the people rejected it.
Judicial involvement in elections is not without high risk to the judges involved, or the political stability.
To deliver their judgment nullifying the rigged presidential election in 2020, the Malawi Defence Forces arranged to clothe all five judges of the Constitutional Court of Malawi who sat on the case with bullet-proof vests.
In the same year, by contrast, the ruling party in Mali chose to steal through the courts 31 seats won by the opposition in parliament. The result was an uprising that led first to the dissolution of the Constitutional Court, and later the overthrow of the government in a military coup.
Ghana’s 2024 election was the first in nearly one and a half decades not to end up in the courts. The candidate of the ruling party and incumbent Vice-President, Mahamudu Bawumia, conceded the race long before a far-from-credible electoral commission had got around to announcing any results. Ahead of the election, the opposition had made it clear that they would not contemplate going to court if they were denied victory. In his concession, Bawumia saved the country from what would have been an assured date with instability.
Judges do not always wait until after the ballot to weigh in with their own votes. In Burundi in 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza was determined to run for a third term even though it seemed clear that he was constitutionally barred from doing so. The case ended up before the Constitutional Court where the judges initially decided to uphold term limits barring the president from running for a third term. Under pressure from a barrage of personalised presidential threats, the Vice-President of the Constitutional Court, Sylvere Nimpagaritse, fled into exile and “the remaining judges then changed their decision in Nkurunziza’s favour.”
Of course, the model of judicial overthrow of the popular will and its replacement with judges as the only eligible voters is an exclusively Nigerian invention. The politicians who control Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) are quick to intone “Go to court” at the end of every rigged election, secure in the knowledge that they have also rigged the courts and have many of the judges safely locked away inside their bedrooms.
In Nigeria’s 2023 election cycle, over 81% of the seats contested were decided by the judges. This business model of managing elections is bad both for democracy and for the independence of the judiciary.
First, it denies citizens the right to decide who governs them or on what platform.
Second, how judges achieve this result is not much different from the toppling of elective government by soldiers with guns. The only difference when the judges do it is that they deploy the artifice of law when in fact, what they seek to do is to replace legality with corrupt whim.
Third, the depth of judicial involvement in elections in Nigeria makes the judiciary a plaything of the politicians who have every incentive to capture and corrupt it.
Fourth, this creates an internal market in judicial business that casualises all but political cases where the judges involved increase their chances of trading in judicial power and legitimacy for cash or powerful networks at the hands of politically exposed litigants.
In 2025, Nigeria will enter the foothills of another major election cycle. With all the political parties all but defanged, the main theatre of activity will be the judiciary.
In Imo State, for instance, where the National Judicial Council (NJC) has removed the Chief Judge for falsifying her age, the State Governor has chosen not to designate any replacement because, ostensibly, he does not find the options available politically palatable.
In the elections in Tanzania this year and Uganda at the end of the year, judges will be very active, persecuting regime opponents.
In Nigeria, that is already routine even before the electoral gong tolls. The upshot is almost assuredly, to guarantee uncertainty instead of ending it.
When he wrote in 1968, Ali Mazrui thought that the opening months of the year seemed to guarantee turbulence in Africa. Today, that tendency occurs all year round. Far from becoming the exception, Africa’s January may have infected the remaining months of the year with a turbulent contagion
*A lawyer and a teacher, Odinkalu can be reached at chidi.odinkalu@tufts.edu

The post Does Africa Have a January Problem? appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Centre for Community Law

Celebrating 50 Years of ECOWAS: A Jubilee of Unity and Progress?

Centre for Community Law — Wed, 01 Jan 2025 23:46:14 +0000

Celebrating 50 Years of ECOWAS: A Jubilee of Unity and Progress?
Center for Community Law

The ECOWAS Authority has announced grand plans to celebrate the 50th anniversary of ECOWAS with pomp and pageantry across all member states throughout 2025. The celebration will commence in Ghana and culminate in Togo.
The festivities will span across all member States, with a special focus on Nigeria, home to the ECOWAS headquarters and General Yakubu Gowon, the last living Founding Father.
The Heads of State and Government of fifteen West African countries established the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by signing the ECOWAS Treaty on May 28, 1975, in Lagos, Nigeria. The Treaty of Lagos was signed by the Heads of State and Government of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Togo. Its mission was to promote economic integration across the region. Cabo Verde joined the Bloc in 1977, bringing its membership to sixteen. However, Mauritania, the only Arabic-speaking member, withdrew in December 2000, reducing the membership to fifteen. Mauritania recently signed a new associate-membership agreement in August 2017.
The 1975 Treaty has since been replaced by the Revised Treaty of 1993, which reformed several aspects of the Bloc. Notably, it strengthened ECOWAS’s stance on human rights by incorporating the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights into its legal system and reinforcing the ECOWAS Court.
Since its creation, ECOWAS’s membership has remained stable at fifteen, despite Mauritania’s exit. However, this stability is now threatened by the potential departure of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from the Bloc this January.
ECOWAS has faced challenges in achieving its core aim of integration. Despite significant accomplishments, particularly in the area of free movement, ECOWAS citizens often feel disconnected from the Bloc due to its limited relevance in their daily lives.
Hopefully, this celebration—an undoubtedly costly venture—will focus on the people, with a concerted effort to sensitize them to the core values of ECOWAS.
Hopefully, it would usher in an era of renewed cooperation for unity and progress in all areas of its competence.

The post Celebrating 50 Years of ECOWAS: A Jubilee of Unity and Progress? appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Centre for Community Law

Nigeria makes the list of top 20 nationalities claiming asylum in the UK

Centre for Community Law — Sat, 21 Dec 2024 14:22:20 +0000

Nigeria makes the list of top 20 nationalities claiming asylum in the UK
Center for Community Law

A recent UK Home Office Data names Nigeria as among the top 20 nationalities claiming asylum in the UK. The data, which covers the period of 2010 to September 2024 shows that Nigeria is the 18th top nationality claiming asylum in the UK and the third in Africa, following Sudan and Eritrea.
Although Nigeria has always made the list of nationalities claiming asylum in the UK, the September 2024 number of 1,597 is a record high number, from the previous 2016 height of 1,158 asylum applications. For context, the data from 2010 to September 2024 shows the following: it was 798 applications in 2010; 732 in 2011; 959 in 2012; 931 in 2013; 899 in 2014; 917 in 2015; 1,158 in 2016; 1048 in 2017, 839 in 2018; 937 in 2019; 647 in 2020; 690 in 2021; 839 in 2022; 900 in 2023 and 1596 in September 2024.
There are numerous factors compelling individuals to flee their country of nationality. These “push factors” may include political turmoil, armed conflict, or severe human rights violations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines a refugee as “someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence.” Such individuals must have a “well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.” Refugees typically cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War, as well as ethnic, tribal, and religious violence, are primary causes of people fleeing their countries.
In modern times, those seeking asylum fall into a broader range of reasons than those traditionally used to define refugees. Factors such as hunger, poverty, and economic hardship – which more aptly categorize individuals as economic migrants-now drive immigration, even from relatively safe countries where return would not attract significant attention. However, since these would hardly qualify them for asylum, asylum seekers, irrespective of their individual push factor, yet claim asylum on allegation of political persecution, fear of violence or human rights violations.
For example, the severe human rights violations and conflicts in Eritrea and the civil war in Sudan likely account for the respective asylum-seeker numbers of 3,472 and 3,762 from these countries.
In Nigeria’s case, attributing the high numbers of asylum claims purely to conflict or severe human rights violations is more complex. Economic hardship and issues such as sexual orientation appear to be driving factors. The unprecedented rise in poverty and economic struggles in 2024 likely plays a significant role in the record-breaking number of asylum claims, making it challenging to link these figures solely to armed conflict or egregious human rights abuses.

The post Nigeria makes the list of top 20 nationalities claiming asylum in the UK appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Centre for Community Law

Ghana 2024 Elections, ECOWAS and AES Juntas

Centre for Community Law — Sun, 15 Dec 2024 14:57:12 +0000

Ghana 2024 Elections, ECOWAS and AES Juntas
Center for Community Law

By Paul Ejime

Ghana has pulled off another feat in democratic consolidation after successfully conducting a ninth round of generally peaceful Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. While democratic elections have become a norm in the country, the 2024 General Elections were distinct in various aspects that challenged the resilience of democracy, yet, Ghanaians rose to the occasion
Forty-eight hours after the poll, the Electoral Commission (EC) announced processed results from 267 out of 276 constituencies, and declared former President John Dramani Mahama, candidate of the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), as the winner and President-elect with 56.55% of the votes against 40.61% scored by the out-going Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia, the presidential fag-bearer of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP).
Indeed, less than 24 hours from the close of balloting, Vice President Bawumia had telephoned President-elect Mahama to concede defeat.
Also, following the declaration of the official results by EC, out-going President Nana Akufo-Addo congratulated Mahama on “his decisive victory” and invited him to a meeting to initiate the transition process.
There was no rocket science to it, but a matter of political actors respecting the will of the people. The two dominant political parties had agents in almost all the more than 40,000 polling stations, who monitored process and relayed polling results to their party data system for parallel vote collation/tabulation.
Like in most elections, the run-up to Ghana 2024 was not without political tension, misinformation, disinformation, fake news and hate speech, culminating in violent incidents in some Regions/Districts, with at least one or two reported deaths and injuries.
Even after the results of the presidential race were announced, shootings, looting and destruction of public and private properties were still reported in some volatile regions. Police reported some arrests and promised prosecution of culprits.
Similar post-election violence is not uncommon in Ghana, but it reached a crescendo in the 2020 elections when eight people were killed.
Some critics believe that the “unsatisfactory” handling of the 2020 election killings and the lack of public confidence in some public institutions, might have contributed to the government’s defeat at the poll. The other factors include economic hardship, allegations of official corruption, nepotism and “political arrogance” exhibited by some public officials.
Also, artisanal illegal gold mining, locally called “galamsey,” and its negative environmental consequences (including degradation of water bodies and destruction of forest reserves) have become a major political issue, with the two major political parties trading allegations over complicity.
Equally concerning were the menace of violent extremism and vigilantism or the use of thugs/private security agents by politicians, despite the existence of the Anti-Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 999 of 1999.
The combined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused severe economic disruptions across the globe, currency fluctuation and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has impacted food security for many African countries, have left the Ghanaian economy reeling out of control amid high inflation and unemployment, especially among the youth. Also, the country’s debt crisis and engagement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for economic recovery might have played a significant role in the outcome of the elections.
Akufo-Addo and Mahama, who will become Ghana’s 13^th President since the country’s independence from Britain in 1957, have now locked horns in four presidential battles with both emerging victorious on two occasions – (2012 and 2024 Mahama) and (2016 and 2020 Akufo-Addo).
The 2020 race produced a hung parliament with the two dominant parties having an equal number of MPs in parliament, and the opposition NDC producing the parliamentary Speaker for the first time in the country’s political history. The decision by four MPs to quit their parties and the Supreme Court’s order stopping the Speaker from declaring the MPs’ seats vacant had aggravated the political tension.
Ghana has 24 registered political parties. Thirteen (13) fielded presidential candidates, while fifteen (15) had candidates for the parliamentary elections, complemented by independents. Nonetheless, the ruling NPP and the opposition NDC remain the dominant parties, alternating control of political power three times in 32 years (2000, 2008 and 2016) and now in 2024.
According to the EC, 900,000 new eligible voters were added to the national voter’s register in 2024 bringing the total to 18,774.159 (15% higher than in 2020), in an estimated national population of 34.42 million.
In a marked departure from tradition, the 2024 political campaigns were more of a door-to-door affair than public rallies. The NDC’s stronghold is the Volta Region and parts of the North and Muslim community, while the NPP draws its majority following from the Akan ethnic group, mainly from the Ashanti and other Southern Regions.
Religion is not overly contentious in Ghana, but the 2024 poll tested the country’s religious tolerance. It was the first time in Ghana’s history that two candidates from the two major political parties, professing different faiths came from the same region, the North. Mahama is Christian and Bawumia a Muslim.
In the end, Mahama recorded a sweeping victory with a more than 1.5 million majority vote margin, the highest since 1992. There is no perfect election. However, Ghana has demonstrated that an electoral process, which is a multi-stakeholder responsibility is integral to the entrenchment of democratic culture, nurtured by strong and resilient institutions.
As the icing on the cake, Ghana, for the first time, also has its first elected female Vice President, Prof Nana Opoku-Agyemang, Mahama’s running mate in the 2024 elections.
Local and international election observers, including from ECOWAS, the African Union and the Commonwealth, and civil society organisations, were unanimous in their positive assessment of the outcome of Ghana’s latest elections, the professionalism of most actors, and the transparency of the electoral process bar the isolated violent incidents, which they captured in their reports with recommendations particularly on collation and results management for the relevant authorities to address.
Incidentally, the ECOWAS Election Observation Mission to Ghana was led by Nigeria’s former Vice President Namadi Sambo, while the West African Elders’ Forum was headed by his boss, former President Goodluck Jonathan. The fact that President Jonathan, with Sambo as his deputy, also telephoned then-candidate Muhammadu Buhari to concede defeat in Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election, just as Bawumia has done in Ghana, was not lost on the international community.
By and large, after the successful and peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections in Senegal and Liberia, the outcome of Ghana’s elections is a strong message that democracy, with all its flaws, is the way to go, by providing the people with the mechanism to periodically change leaders who fail to deliver.
The conversation on the credibility or transparency of elections remains open-ended, but a flawed election is not enough reason to jettison democracy.
With the January 2025 deadline fast approaching on the notice issued by the junta leaders of the Alliance of Sahel States, AES, to pull their countries – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS, the message from Accra is that it is never too late for a patriotic leader to do the right thing in the interest of the people.
The citizens of AES countries are going through severe socioeconomic hardship, insecurity and political isolation, which could only worsen, with an avoidable humanitarian disaster if their countries should unceremoniously quit ECOWAS.
ECOWAS might have made some mistakes in its approach to halt the wave of military incursions into politics in West Africa, but that is no justification for military coups or unconstitutional change of governments.
Since their withdrawal announcement, the junta leaders have made little to no progress on constitutional rules or implementation of their transition programmes. They should not vindicate the notion that they are opportunistic power grabbers.
For their part, ECOWAS leaders must put their house in order at the national and regional levels by ending bad governance, corruption, human rights violations, election rigging as well as “constitutional and ballot box coups.”
*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security and Governance Communications

The post Ghana 2024 Elections, ECOWAS and AES Juntas appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Centre for Community Law