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ECOWAS, UN Joint Mission to Support Peace Efforts in Guinea Bissau

Guest — Fri, 21 Feb 2025 18:21:02 +0000

ECOWAS, UN Joint Mission to Support Peace Efforts in Guinea Bissau
Center for Community Law

A joint mission of ECOWAS and the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), has been dispatched “to support national efforts toward peace and stability” in Guinea Bissau.

“The mission is in line with the directive of the 66th Ordinary Session of the Authority of (ECOWAS) Heads of States and Government held on 15th December 2024 in Abuja, Nigeria, to ‘deploy a high-level political mission to the country to support efforts by the political actors and stakeholders toward political consensus on the electoral calendar,’” the ECOWAS Commission said in a statement on Thursday.

The objective is “to accompany Guinea Bissau with the requisite technical support toward a successful electoral cycle and the promotion of peace, security, and stability in the country,” the statement added.

The 23-28 February 2025 Mission is led by Ambassador Bagudu Hirse, Nigeria’s former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and will be joined by Ambassador Kalilou Traore, Ivorian Ambassador to Nigeria and ECOWAS, representing the ECOWAS Permanent Representatives Committee, and Ambassador Babatunde Ajisomo, ECOWAS former Representative to Liberia, as Special Adviser to the Head of Mission.

Other members of the joint delegation are Mr Cherno Mamoudu Jallow, a former Senior Political Advisor, Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the DR Congo and the UN Mission, MONUSCO, and Mr. Papa Birame Sene, from the Senegalese Electoral Commission.

A technical team, including Ambassador Ngozi Ukaeje, the ECOWAS Resident Representative in Guinea Bissau, and staff of the Directorate of Political Affairs of the ECOWAS Commission will support the Mission.

The delegation will hold consultations with the government and other critical stakeholders on the political and security developments in the country.

President Embalo assumed office in February 2020 following a disputed December 2019 presidential poll, whose outcome was finally decided by the Supreme Court in September 2020.

His tenure has been characterised by instability and political tensions including two alleged military coups and the government’s dissolution of the national parliament, with the national electoral commission and the Supreme Court in a dysfunctional state.

ECOWAS has a military mission providing a level of stabilisation in the country.

Early this month, a controversially constituted Supreme Court fixed the presidential election in Guinea Bissau for September 2025, explaining that the president’s tenure began after the apex Court ruled in his favour in September 2020, and not February when he took the oath of office.

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Djibouti’s Foreign Minister is African Union Commission’s New Chairperson

Guest — Sat, 15 Feb 2025 22:00:27 +0000

Djibouti’s Foreign Minister is African Union Commission’s New Chairperson
Center for Community Law

*By Paul Ejime*

Continental leaders at their 38th ordinary summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on Saturday 15 February 2025 elected Djibouti’s Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf as the African Union Commission, AUC’s Chairperson for four years.
Youssouf replaces Moussa Faki of Chad, who has led the Commission since 2017.
Selma Malika Haddadi, Algeria’s Ambassador to Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the African Union was also elected Deputy Chairperson.
With the position zoned to East Africa, Youssouf waited until the seventh round of balloting to obtain the mandatory 33 votes to clinch the post at the expense of two other contestants, Madagascar’s ex-Foreign Minister Richard Randriamandrato and Kenya’s former Prime Minister and veteran opposition leader Raila Odinga.
Haddadi also won in the 7th round beating her North African rivals from Egypt and Morocco, to replace out-going Dr Monique Nsanzabaganwa of Rwanda on the deputy Chairperson’s role.
Odinga, the frontrunner for the leadership position before the summit, won the first round and Youssouf led from the second round after the Madagascan candidate dropped off the race.
Saturday’s marathon balloting was preceded by the election of AUC Commissioners including the re-election of Nigeria’s Ambassador Bankole Adeoye as Commissioner of Political Affairs, Peace and Security and Ghana’s Ambassador Amma Twum-Amoah as Commissioner of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, both from West Africa.
Youssouf, the 59-year-old Djibouti diplomat, studied foreign languages in France, with advanced training in business management in the UK and Brussels, He served as his country’s ambassador to Egypt under three previous administrations before he was appointed Foreign Minister in 2005.
“If I am elected (Chairperson) of the African Union Commission, my priority will be financial management and governance,” he said in Rabat, Morocco last December. “My goal will also be to mobilise internal funds. Djibouti has always been a source of trust and credibility, able to play a leading role in promoting stability and security…”
He will inherit a continental organisation, grappling with internal leadership challenges, compounded by daunting continental and global problems, including insecurity, political and socio-economic instability, insecurity, terrorism and violent extremism, civil and inter-state wars, general governance and climate change concerns.
With active or simmering violent conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Mozambique and part of Ethiopia, the AUC’s host country, and at least six of the 55-nation Member States – Chad, Sudan, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Niger – under military dictatorships, the new AUC leadership under Youssouf have their job cut out for them.
The AUC replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002.
*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communications*

The post Djibouti’s Foreign Minister is African Union Commission’s New Chairperson appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Guest

The Black Sheep in ECOWAS

Guest — Fri, 14 Feb 2025 23:06:39 +0000

The Black Sheep in ECOWAS
Center for Community Law

*By Paul Ejime*

ECOWAS is struggling to whip its wayward member States into line, but the list of leaders undermining the principles and objectives of the 15-nation West African regional economic bloc is growing.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which proclaimed themselves the Alliance of Sahel States, AES, are making every effort to quit, while Guinea, a fourth military-ruled Member State, is enduring a tardy transition programme.
While much attention is focused on these four countries, political tension is building up in at least four other ECOWAS Member States.
In Cote d’Ivoire, the next presidential election is scheduled for October this year but as happened in the run-up to the last election in 2020, there is so much uncertainty in the air. Sitting President Alassane Ouattara, 83, says he would like to continue serving his country as president, although his party has not yet decided its candidate.
With tenure elongation as a political tinderbox, Ouattara had previously said he would like to step down to give the young ones a chance but only if his old rivals would quit politics too.
If he runs in October, opponents and critics would consider it Ouattara’s fourth term bid in the ECOWAS region where third-term syndrome is a major source of political instability.
The Gambia is another ticking bomb, linked with the political ambition of President Adama Borrow, who appears laser-focused on the 2026 presidential election.
ECOWAS had to mobilise human and material resources including military assets to end the 22-year brutal dictatorship of Yahya Jammeh in January 2017 in the Gambia.
But instead of concentrating on governance or real change, President Barrow, who was inaugurated as Jammeh’s successor in Senegal because of instability in the Gambia, is still operating the same 1997 Jammeh era Constitution and pressuring ECOWAS to endorse his establishment of a Special Tribunal to try crimes committed under the Jammeh dictatorship after co-opting some of the old regime prominent figures to win re-election.
Barrow set up a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) in 2017, which submitted a draft Constitution to him in September 2020. His government, however, jettisoned that draft document produced at great financial cost, to concentrate on his re-election in 2021.
A 2024 draft Constitution, which his opponents call the “Barrow Draft Constitution” was only presented to the Gambian Parliament in December 2024. It is expected to pass through a national referendum before another presidential election in 2026, and Barrow has already declared he would run.
This month (February 2025) is critical in the political history of two other ECOWAS member States – Guinea Bissau and Togo.
While the world’s attention is focused elsewhere, Togo will hold a dubious Senatorial election on 15 February 2025.
The President of the Independent National Electoral Commission, CENI, had extended the date for the submission of candidates to 7 January 2025, in line with a government decree dated 26 December 2024, which set the senatorial elections for February 15, 2025.
Analysts have dubbed the vote Perpetuating Gnassingbé Dynasty 2025 Elections a reference to President Faure Gnassingbé’s succession of his father Gnassingbé Eyadema in 2005.
In March 2024, Togo’s parliament dominated by Faure’s ruling UNIR party, voted 87-0 to adopt a constitutional change decreed by the President that eliminates citizens’ right to vote directly for the country’s leader.
That change to a parliamentary system of government, in violation of ECOWAS protocols, also established a new powerful executive President of the Council of Ministers (PCM), to be elected by members of Parliament, and will function as a prime minister with sweeping powers.
Since the political party or coalition with the most seats in Parliament will produce the PCM, Faure is guaranteed that role going by the results of the sham legislative elections hurriedly held in April 2024 after the controversial constitutional review that gave the UNIR 108 of the 113 Parliamentary seats.
The February 15 Senatorial elections will create a new upper chamber of Togo’s legislature, with 75% of the seats elected by local authority representatives and the remainder appointed directly by the PCM.
In addition, the PCM will serve a six-year term, against the five years of the current presidency, and is renewable indefinitely.
These changes are against the spirit and letters of the ECOWAS protocols and instruments, but the Faure regime has gone unchallenged.
Little wonder Togo’s Foreign Minister Robert Dussey recently declared that his country could join the AES countries, even though President Gnassingbé, is one of the leaders mandated by ECOWAS to negotiate rapprochement with the alliance States. The suggestion could be a ploy to pre-empt any move by ECOWAS to chastise the Lome government.
As if these were not enough troubles, the President of Guinea Bissau Umaro Embalo has complicated matters for the regional organisation.
Embalo’s presidential mandate expires on 27 February 2025, but only a miracle can stop him from continuing in office beyond that date, since he has dissolved the country’s parliament for more than a year now, with the electoral commission and the Supreme Court also in comatose.
Like Faure, Embalo’s moves have also gone unchallenged by other ECOWAS leaders.
ECOWAS leaders, who undermine the organisation’s objectives and regional integration agenda without consequence are emboldened by their colleagues who fail to call them out.
This has been on for over a decade in the organisation which marks its 50th anniversary in May this year.
Given its achievements as a foremost Regional Economic Community in Africa, the authoritarian tendencies and disregard for rules by the ECOWAS black sheep, have caused more than enough damage to demand introspection and reflection on the consequences/implications of a West Africa without ECOWAS as a stabilising force.
How can the “ECOWAS of States” be transformed into an “ECOWAS of People”?
Ghana’s new President John Mahama has started well by naming a Special Envoy to the AES countries. His initiative should fit into an integrated ECOWAS effort to arrest the drift.
The Faure Gnassingbe-Senegalese President Diomaye Faye pair as ECOWAS mediators with the AES countries is not working and should be reviewed for effective results.
Before convening another emergency summit, the ongoing African Union Summit in Addis Ababa presents a cost-effective opportunity for ECOWAS leaders to put heads together on the sidelines of the continental gathering to discuss the region’s myriad security, economic and governance challenges.
The re-election of Nigeria’s Ambassador Bankole Adeoye as the AU Commissioner of Political Affairs, Peace and Security and the election of Ghana’s Ambassador Amma Twum-Amoah as Commissioner of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, (both from West Africa), is another good development that ECOWAS can leverage on.
Also, citizens and civil society organisations in the ECOWAS region should live up to their fundamental civic responsibilities by holding rulers/leaders to account.
The axiom that power belongs to the people is not an alien concept.
For instance, without the use of kinetics or military incursion, the people of Burkina Faso ousted President Blaise Compaoré and forced him into exile in 2014.
Recently the electorates in Liberia, Senegal and Ghana also changed the governments of their countries through the ballot box and by protecting their votes.
Voters who sell their votes, or vote along primordial ethnic, tribal or religious lines, and citizens who fail to participate in politics, expecting others to pick their chestnuts from the fire only have themselves to blame.
Every country deserves the type of government it deserves.
Citizens are indispensable repositories of power in political governance. If ECOWAS leaders want ECOWAS and their countries to work, they can do so. Every country gets the type of government or leaders it deserves.
Lastly, while ECOWAS must intentionally tackle its existential challenges, the AES junta leaders should not create the impression that ECOWAS is responsible for the leadership, security and colonial problems in their countries.

*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communications*

The post The Black Sheep in ECOWAS appeared first on Center for Community Law. written by Guest

Before It Becomes ECO-WAS

Guest — Sun, 02 Feb 2025 10:19:48 +0000

Before It Becomes ECO-WAS
Center for Community Law

By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu*
In the aftermath of the announcement on 28 January 2024 by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger Republic denouncing the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and leaving the regional bloc “without delay”, reactions spanned the spectrum from hubris to hyperbole. From Nigeria, the regional anchor and chair of the Community, the predominant sentiment was – “the three countries would have more to lose.”
Outside the continent some described the situation as “West Africa’s ‘Brexit’ moment” or Sahelexit, likening it to Britain’s decision in 2016 to quit the European Union (EU). Reinforcing the comparison, the finalization this past week of the exit of the three countries from ECOWAS coincided with the fifth anniversary of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU. The temptation to read too much into this coincidence should be resisted.
It is significant that the announcement by the three ECOWAS frontier states in 2024 was made shortly after the arrival in France of Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu for what was said to be a “private visit”. All three countries have been involved in a plurinational dispute involving both Nigeria and France and connected with military rule and transitions to elected government.
In reality, however, the disputes have been more about the historical legacies of French colonial rule, the complex insecurity in the Sahel, and Nigeria’s regional role. In their joint statement, the three countries accused ECOWAS of being “under the influence of foreign powers and betraying its founding principles.”
These were not allegations to be treated lightly. There was also significance to the fact that the announcement came on the eve of ECOWAS’ golden jubilee year and represented the latest escalation in the debate about how to calibrate inter-state relations in an increasingly complex regional environment.
It did not have to end this way. As a matter of law and notwithstanding the peremptory language deployed, the departure declaration by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in 2024 denouncing the ECOWAS Treaty was not immediate. Article 91(1) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty requires departing countries to “give to the Executive Secretary (President of the Commission) one year’s notice in writing” and their departure can only take effect at the end of the period.
ECOWAS had every opportunity during this period to exert itself to show it desired a different outcome. In the end, the Community appeared manifestly incapable of sustaining two contradictory ideas. One is the strategic importance of good neighbourliness within ECOWAS as a regional community of sovereign peers; the other is the commitment to government founded on democratic legitimacy.
The fact that ECOWAS finds itself in the current predicament ostensibly over the fate of elective government in the region is a somewhat, perverse acknowledgement of how far it has advanced since its origins.
Of the 15 heads of state and government present at the adoption of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States in May 1975, seven were military rulers and another six were succeeded by soldiers. Felix Houphöuet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire was the only president among the original signatories who was neither a soldier nor directly succeeded by one, but his successor was toppled by the military in December 1999. Abdou Diouf, who represented Senegal at the adoption ceremony was a Prime Minister to President Leopold Senghor, whom he later succeeded as president on 1 April 1981.
Cape Verde and Senegal remain the only ECOWAS countries to have been spared the experience of military rule. This fact should ordinarily have equipped the Community and its member states with adequate skills in reacting to military coups. However, it would be a mistake to suppose that this denouement is the result of an argument over coups alone or mostly.
ECOWAS began life in the middle of the global energy crisis of the 1970s, founded by rulers who declared it their goal to “foster and accelerate the economic and social development of our states, to improve the living standards of our peoples.” A combination of misrule and debt overhang miscarried this objective even before the ink was dry on the parchment it was written on.
In the wake of the instability that followed, the Community adjusted its mission in 1981 to include mutual defence and security, importing an implicit obligation of regional solidarity. When the Mano River countries, first Liberia and then Sierra Leone, descended into war from 1989, Nigeria, then led by military ruler, Ibrahim Babangida, launched a regional intervention known as ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990.
A review of the original ECOWAS Treaty followed in 1993, chaired by Nigeria’s former military ruler, Yakubu Gowon, himself the prime mover behind the original ECOWAS vision. The Revised ECOWAS Treaty again enhanced the obligations of mutual solidarity among the countries of the sub-region.
As the anchor country in ECOWAS, Nigeria was naturally expected to bear much of the burden of financing this obligation. But a straitened economy at the end of decades of misrule has frustrated that capability on the part of Nigeria at precisely the time that the countries of the Sahel needed its presence the most in response to Islamist insurgencies.
The resulting vacuum has been filled by external actors. The French proved to be the worst enemies in their attempt to fill this vacuum, providing the soldiers who seized power in these countries with a common foil. French departure in November 2022 and regional isolation by ECOWAS have proved to be a boon to Russia which has quickly built up assets and relations with the regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
Notionally, the departure of these three countries will cost ECOWAS 54.35% of its landmass, 20% of its sovereign membership, 16.5% of its population and seven per cent of its GDP. The actual costs are incalculable. First, Mali and Niger, which are landlocked, have been historic buffers between the violence of the Sahel and the Maghreb on the one hand and the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea on the other. Their departure could create new security exposures.
Second, the informal economies of West Africa depend significantly on these countries. Trade, migration and pilgrimage routes traverse through them, and the impact on the poor and the excluded who rely on these informal routes could either prove to be prohibitive or expose the hollowness of the region’s inter-state borders in legitimacy and meaning in the lives of ordinary people.
Third, the three countries are important for civil aviation in West Africa for overflights. If they were to deny these, ticketing and routing into their southern neighbours could also become prohibitive.
The upshot in a region defined by notoriously porous borders and transnational communities is that severing ties could be easier said than done. Even now, there is still a reason not to give up hope: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger retain their membership of the CFA Franc Zone in the West African Economic and Monetary Union, UEMOA, five of whose members remain in the ECOWAS.
ECOWAS has put a brave face on its diminution, claiming that its institutional doors remain open to these countries but their Alliance of Sahel States (AES) is up and running. The feeling remains inescapable that this outcome was not foregone and that it has been enabled by high-level ineptitude among the leadership of ECOWAS.
Ghana’s new president John Mahama, has in a practical manner made it a priority to advance rapprochement with the AES countries, by appointing a personal envoy to lead this process. The Community should fully support him.
It is impossible not to contemplate what might have been. Over the past year while the imminence of these losses escalated, Nigeria’s President and Chairperson of ECOWAS, Bola Tinubu, has been to France on numerous occasions. Consider what might have been if he found time to engage and personally visit these West African neighbours. Surely, that was a mission fit for a new presidential jet.
*A lawyer & a teacher, Odinkalu can be reached at chidi.odinkalu@tufts.edu

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530133841737248947

jedidiah — Sun, 19 Jan 2025 01:09:12 +0000

530133841737248947
Center for Community Law

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Celebrating 50 Years of ECOWAS: A Jubilee of Unity and Progress?

Centre for Community Law — Wed, 01 Jan 2025 23:46:14 +0000

Celebrating 50 Years of ECOWAS: A Jubilee of Unity and Progress?
Center for Community Law

The ECOWAS Authority has announced grand plans to celebrate the 50th anniversary of ECOWAS with pomp and pageantry across all member states throughout 2025. The celebration will commence in Ghana and culminate in Togo.
The festivities will span across all member States, with a special focus on Nigeria, home to the ECOWAS headquarters and General Yakubu Gowon, the last living Founding Father.
The Heads of State and Government of fifteen West African countries established the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by signing the ECOWAS Treaty on May 28, 1975, in Lagos, Nigeria. The Treaty of Lagos was signed by the Heads of State and Government of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Togo. Its mission was to promote economic integration across the region. Cabo Verde joined the Bloc in 1977, bringing its membership to sixteen. However, Mauritania, the only Arabic-speaking member, withdrew in December 2000, reducing the membership to fifteen. Mauritania recently signed a new associate-membership agreement in August 2017.
The 1975 Treaty has since been replaced by the Revised Treaty of 1993, which reformed several aspects of the Bloc. Notably, it strengthened ECOWAS’s stance on human rights by incorporating the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights into its legal system and reinforcing the ECOWAS Court.
Since its creation, ECOWAS’s membership has remained stable at fifteen, despite Mauritania’s exit. However, this stability is now threatened by the potential departure of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from the Bloc this January.
ECOWAS has faced challenges in achieving its core aim of integration. Despite significant accomplishments, particularly in the area of free movement, ECOWAS citizens often feel disconnected from the Bloc due to its limited relevance in their daily lives.
Hopefully, this celebration—an undoubtedly costly venture—will focus on the people, with a concerted effort to sensitize them to the core values of ECOWAS.
Hopefully, it would usher in an era of renewed cooperation for unity and progress in all areas of its competence.

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ECOWAS and The Gambia – Preventing Another Dangerous Slide

Centre for Community Law — Mon, 16 Dec 2024 19:19:21 +0000

ECOWAS and The Gambia – Preventing Another Dangerous Slide
Center for Community Law

Paul Ejime

Eight years after ECOWAS led the international community by deploying enormous human and material resources to free the Gambia and its citizens from the asphyxiating hold of a ruthless dictator, Yahya Jammeh, the country risks drifting into another avoidable instability if urgent measures are not taken.

Nigeria, the regional powerhouse had to put its military assets including Air Force fighter jets and a Naval ship at the disposal of the region, while Senegalese foot soldiers marched on their way to Banjul, the Gambian capital before the military Captain-turned-Colonel Jammeh was forced into exile in Equatorial Guinea in January 2017 after he had refused to concede defeat to President-elect Adama Barrow after the December 2016 election.

After toppling Gambia’s independence President, Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, in a 1994 military coup, Jammeh became a tin God and even boasted that he would rule the Gambia for “a billion years.” This writer captured the ordeal of Gambians under Jammeh in an article entitled The Gambia, Jammeh and the Proverbial Bull in a China Shop.

Fear and national insecurity were palpable then, and to avoid a constitutional crisis, ECOWAS ensured that Barrow was officially sworn in as Gambia’s President in his country’s embassy in Dakar, Senegal with an ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG) code-named “Operation Restore Democracy” quickly deployed to douse the tension, stabilise the situation and restore peace to the country.

Barrow, a former real estate developer, was not originally on the ballot for the 2016 election but was chosen by the party after Jammeh had jailed the presidential front-runner Ousainou Darboe and all other opposition leaders.

However, despite his well-documented atrocities, including the killings and enforced disappearances of opponents using his killer-squad “the Junglers,” and forcing opposition figures and civil society activists into exile, Jammeh commands political influence in the Gambia today, partly due to Barrow’s political machinations.

Many Gambians are now forced to relive the nightmares of the Jammeh era for no justifiable reason, other than the pursuit of the personal political ambition of Barrow, who has since fallen out with Darboe and other key members of the opposition United Democratic Party on whose coalition he won the 2016 election.

After accusing Darboe and others of going back on their words not to serve in his government, Barrow reneged on his earlier pledge to step down after three years of the five-year term.

To consolidate his political power base, Barrow formed a new National People’s Party (NPP) which controversially joined forces with a faction of Jammeh’s APRC party and retained the presidency in the 2021 presidential election.

After co-opting several Jammeh henchmen to consolidate his grip on power, Barrow now sees his political opponents, the media and human rights advocates as stumbling blocks to his third-term dream, which is now tearing the Gambia apart.

At Barrow’s behest, ECOMIG’s mandate has been renewed several times, amid serious concerns within the Gambian armed forces about marginalisation, while “Barrow surrounds himself with ECOMIG forces for personal protection.”

Instead of promoting national unity and cohesion or fostering reconciliation, Barrow has become a divisive force, laser-focused on his political ambition and the next election.

In the early days of his administration a Truth, Reconciliation and Reparation Commission (TRRC) was set up under the Special Accountability Mechanism Act, to address the atrocities of the Jammeh regime. An Anti-torture Act, Victims Reparations Fund Act and the Special Prosecutor’s Office Act were also enacted.

Similarly, a Constitution Review Commission (CRC) was established to produce a people-oriented Constitution to replace that of 1997 used by Jammeh for his repressive dictatorship.

The Barrow government accepted 263 of the 265 TRRC recommendations through a White Paper with an implementation Plan. However, it rejected the 2020 Draft Constitution produced by the CRC and has drafted a butchered version, whose provisions are unpublicised to be pushed through a national referendum.

Barrow’s political wheeling and dealing has made him increasingly unpopular among his compatriots, who accuse him of replacing governance with perfidy and propaganda.

His government has now set up a Special Tribunal for The Gambia (STTG) to try human rights violations committed between July 1994 and January 2017, including “murder, torture, enforced disappearances, rape and other forms of sexual violence, persecutions and other inhuman acts” and is now pressuring ECOWAS to lend its weight behind the Tribunal.

In principle and, in line with the recommendations of the TRRC, victims of crimes against humanity committed during Jammeh’s brutish regime deserve and should get justice and closure, and accused persons should have their day in court. However, the Barrow government’s approach to this process smacks of a ploy to capture donor funds and clear all obstacles to his third-term ambition.

The government is being clever by half about the STTG, which it established without any inputs from ECOWAS. Ironically, Article 17 of the Tribunal’s Statute saddles the ECOWAS Commission with major responsibilities including setting up an Advisory Council and Management Council of the Special Tribunal.
Article 17.1 – The President of the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS” and “ECOWAS Commission”) (the Appointing Authority) shall appoint the President, Special Prosecutor and Registrar of the Special Tribunal (“The Principals.”)
Article 17.2 – The President of the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS” and “ECOWAS Commission”) shall convene an independent Advisory Council on the Selection of Principals for the Special Tribunal (“Advisory Council”).
Article 17.7 – The Advisory Council shall, upon completion of the evaluation and selection process, submit a report to the President of the ECOWAS Commission (“Appointing Authority”) detailing the suitability of the applicants in the ranked order.
Furthermore, Article 45 states: “The President of the ECOWAS Commission shall establish a Management Committee shall provide administrative and financial oversight to the Special Tribunal. The Management Committee shall consist of representatives of The Gambia, ECOWAS and any
major contributor to the Special Tribunal.
The Management Committee shall have the power to approve the budget and annual report of the Special Tribunal and shall assist its fund-raising.”
From experience and given the complex nature of the work of such tribunals, legal experts strongly believe that involving the ECOWAS Commission in the administration of the STTG would distract from its core mandate of the regional integration agenda. ECOWAS is not a prosecuting body, and it is already neck-deep struggling to rein in errant member States, three of which have served notice to quit over its perceived weak and ineffectual leadership.

Instead of involving ECOWAS in micro-managing the STTG, experts have recommended a Central African Republic (CAR) model for the Gambian Tribunal.

In 2015, CAR with the support of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the UN set up a Special Criminal Court (SCC), which the global rights monitor, Human Rights Watch has described as “a significant, unprecedented initiative to deliver justice for victims of brutal crime…”
“The Court is integrated into (CAR’s) domestic judicial system, but staffed by both international and Central African judges, prosecutors, and administrators. Together with the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has two investigators into crimes committed in the country, the SCC is a significant opportunity to end the widespread impunity that victims of the cycles of violence in the Central African Republic have faced,” Human Rights Watch said in a 2017 Report.
It added: “The SCC may also serve as a potential model for other countries seeking to pursue justice for international crimes in their national systems.”
Interestingly, the Gambia hosts the (African Union) AU-backed Commission for Human and People’s Rights, and according to legal experts, another perfect example for the STTG is the UN and AU-supported Special Tribunal in Senegal which tried and convicted former Chadian leader, Hissène Habré for crimes against humanity during his reign.
Instead of pursuing divisive selfish and personal ambition, capable of pushing the Gambia into another crisis, ECOWAS leaders should impress upon Barrow to focus on delivering good governance and promoting national healing and cohesion for sustainable peace in the country and the region.
Today’s instability in the ECOWAS region is largely attributable to the mindless pursuit of ill-fated third-term ambition of corrupt, insensitive, greedy, selfish, self-serving, power-hungry opportunists, parading themselves as leaders.
*Ejime is a Global Affairs Analyst and Consultant on Peace & Security, and Governance Communications

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The Assembly of the International Seabed Authority

Centre for Community Law — Wed, 04 Dec 2024 15:55:09 +0000

The Assembly of the International Seabed Authority
Center for Community Law

The Assembly’s duties are broadly categorized into policy-making and administrative functions:
Policy Formation
The Assembly establishes general policies in accordance with UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement, ensuring the regulation of seabed activities aligns with international law.
Administrative Oversight
Specific responsibilities include:
Elections: Selecting members of the Council, other key bodies, and the Secretary-General.
Budget Approval: Sanctioning ISA’s two-year budget and determining member contributions.
Regulatory Frameworks: Approving rules and regulations governing prospecting, exploration, and exploitation of seabed resources.
Report Analysis: Reviewing annual reports from the Secretary-General and other relevant bodies.
Future Mandates
As deep-sea mineral exploitation progresses, the Assembly will play a crucial role in ensuring equitable sharing of financial benefits derived from seabed activities. Additionally, it will oversee compensation mechanisms for developing countries affected by diminished export earnings due to seabed production.
This broad spectrum of responsibilities highlights the Assembly’s essential function in shaping and monitoring the sustainable use of seabed resources

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Nigeria Leads Work Permit Applications to the United Kingdom Among Anglophone ECOWAS Countries.

Centre for Community Law — Mon, 04 Nov 2024 16:30:31 +0000

Nigeria Leads Work Permit Applications to the United Kingdom Among Anglophone ECOWAS Countries.
Center for Community Law

The below British Home Office data shows in the first, second, third, and fourth quarters, Nigeria recorded work permit applications to the UK totaling 14,910, 13,987, 15,606, and 15,898, respectively. Over the same periods, Ghana reported 3,709, 4,437, 6,230, and 4,753 applications; Sierra Leone recorded 60, 74, 62, and 80; while Liberia registered 3, 7, 9, and 8. That of The Gambia are 44, 41, 61, 68 for the same period. These figures highlight Nigeria’s position as having the highest number of work permit applications to the UK among the English-speaking countries in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Significant immigration out of the region brings both immediate and long-term impacts. In the short term, there is an inflow of remittances that boost local economies. However, this migration also results in brain drain, particularly in highly skilled sectors, with Nigeria leading in the number of departures. This outflow means fewer qualified professionals are available to drive growth and deliver essential services, which can hinder sustainable development in the region’s economies.
The long-term benefit of high immigration lies in the potential for returning citizens to bring back critical skills and capital, spurring economic growth and industrial development across the region. However, this vision will remain largely unrealized unless ECOWAS member States implement robust and impactful measures to address the underlying causes of mass emigration, including economic instability and limited opportunities, that drive citizens to seek better prospects abroad.

Year	2023
Geographical region	Africa Sub-Saharan
Nationality	Ghana

Sum of Applications	Column Labels
Row Labels	2023 Q1	2023 Q2	2023 Q3	2023 Q4
Visa	2910	3601	5274	3352
Worker (Previously Tier 2)	2833	3518	5145	3240
Temporary Worker (Previously Tier 5)	77	83	129	112
Extensions of stay	799	836	956	1401
Worker (Previously Tier 2)	798	833	950	1395
Temporary Worker (Previously Tier 5)	1	3	6	6
Grand Total	3709	4437	6230	4753

Year	2023
Geographical region	Africa Sub-Saharan
Nationality	Sierra Leone

Sum of Applications	Column Labels
Row Labels	2023 Q1	2023 Q2	2023 Q3	2023 Q4
Visa	48	67	54	67
Worker (Previously Tier 2)	48	67	53	67
Temporary Worker (Previously Tier 5)	0	0	1	0
Extensions of stay	12	7	8	13
Worker (Previously Tier 2)	12	6	8	13
Temporary Worker (Previously Tier 5)	0	1	0	0
Grand Total	60	74	62	80

Year	2023
Geographical region	Africa Sub-Saharan
Nationality	Nigeria

Sum of Applications	Column Labels
Row Labels	2023 Q1	2023 Q2	2023 Q3	2023 Q4
Visa	8277	7652	8609	5345
Worker (Previously Tier 2)	8015	7280	8199	4833
Temporary Worker (Previously Tier 5)	262	372	410	512
Extensions of stay	6633	6335	6997	10553
Worker (Previously Tier 2)	6614	6313	6958	10515
Temporary Worker (Previously Tier 5)	19	22	39	38
Grand Total	14910	13987	15606	15898

Year	2023
Geographical region	Africa Sub-Saharan
Nationality	Liberia

Sum of Applications	Column Labels
Row Labels	2023 Q1	2023 Q2	2023 Q3	2023 Q4
Visa	3	5	8	7
Worker (Previously Tier 2)	3	5	8	7
Extensions of stay	0	2	1	1
Worker (Previously Tier 2)	0	2	1	1
Grand Total	3	7	9	8

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The International Seabed Authority grants Observer Status to the Centre for Community and Oceanic Law

Centre for Community Law — Fri, 25 Oct 2024 15:04:38 +0000

The International Seabed Authority grants Observer Status to the Centre for Community and Oceanic Law
Center for Community Law

We are pleased to announce that the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) has awarded observer status to the Centre for Community and Oceanic Law.
As an NGO Observer, the Centre may:
(a) sit at public meetings of the Assembly of the ISA;
(b) upon invitation from the President, subject to approval by the Assembly, may make oral statements on questions within the scope of its activities.
submit written statements within the scope of its activities that are relevant to the work of the Assembly; and
(c) may designate representatives to participate, without the right to vote, in the deliberations of the Council, upon the invitation of the Council, on questions affecting it or within the scope of its activities.
The Centre’s management views this recognition as a significant milestone in advancing the Centre’s objectives, particularly around deep-seabed issues, within the ECOWAS region. This status will strengthen the Centre’s collaborative work with academic institutions across the subregion, reinforcing its commitment to meaningful progress in this field.
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is an autonomous international organization established under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1994 Agreement).
ISA is the organization through which State Parties to UNCLOS organize and control all mineral-resources-related activities in the Area for the benefit of humankind as a whole. In so doing, ISA has the mandate to ensure the effective protection of the marine environment from harmful effects that may arise from deep-seabed-related activities.
The main organs of ISA are the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat. The Assembly consists of all the Members and is considered the supreme organ. The Council is the executive organ, and the Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General. The Assembly elects the 36 members of the Council from five groups of State parties representing different interests and ensuring an equitable geographical distribution (Art. 161(1)). The Secretary-General is elected by the Assembly from among the candidates proposed by the Council (Art. 166(2)(c)). It is the task of the Assembly to establish the general policies of the Authority in collaboration with the Council (Art. 160(1)), while the Council is entrusted to establish specific policies (Art. 162(1)). The Assembly also approves the budget of the Authority, including the scale of assessment for contributions by States parties, as submitted by the Council (Art. 160(2)(e) (h)), and must finally approve the rules, regulations and procedures relating to prospecting, exploration and exploitation in the Area (Art. 161(2)(f)(ii)). The primary function of the Council, which has an extensive range of powers, is to supervise and control the implementation of Part XI of the Convention on all matters within the competence of ISA (Art. 162 (2)(a)).

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